Forward
This study represents an attempt at a new approach to national security strategy. Since President Reagan’s first in 1987, “The National Security Strategy of the United States” has articulated American interests and goals in a public document that typically generates national and worldwide attention. Yet as many scholars have pointed out, the NSS typically falls well short of strategy in its pure sense. All to date have been largely aspirational, short on detail, lacking clear priorities (and thus winners and losers), and unwilling to link actual resources to expressed goals.
As useful ventures in public diplomacy, and as signposts indicating preferred goals and issues, these documents are important and useful. And the issues they surface matter. But actual national security strategy goes farther and deeper. One unhealthy evolution is the pronounced tendency over time to define almost everything in terms of national security. In recent years, pandemics, drug policy, climate change, disaster relief, immigration and LGBT rights, for example, have found their way into administration national security strategies. These deserve serious and intensive policy consideration and action, as the Covid-19 crisis clearly illustrates. But in my view, they lie outside the traditional national security arena. As Stanley Hoffman presciently observed three decades ago, “National Security’ is considered to be everywhere and constantly at stake.” This trend has robbed the NSS of clarity, laying a national security mantle over much that did not ask for it and placing the Department of Defense at the center of environmental, public health, and social issues of the day, to the detriment of its primary duty to defend our people and territory and those of our treaty allies. While there may be political utility in being purposefully broad and vague, diplomats and soldiers need more if they are to explain and defend American interests in an uncertain, complex and dangerous world. Our friends and allies require, and deserve, clear explanations of how and why they matter, and what they can expect. Our adversaries too, for that matter, are less likely to challenge our core interests if we spell out in concrete detail what they are and how we propose to secure and advance them.
This is of course an inexact science. Readers will find some sharp arguments here – should we revive the US Information Agency? fund another strategic bomber? or national missile defense? or a bigger Army? That is inherent in real strategy. But the exercise itself is important and valuable.
I wish to gratefully acknowledge the generous advice, criticism and support of Lieutenant General Rick Waddell, Brigadier General Mike Meese and my colleagues at the National Defense University in this effort. I hope that decision makers and practitioners who may read this will be encouraged to enlarge upon traditional approaches to national security strategy in the interest of the Common Defense.
R.D. Hooker, Jr.
Table of Contents
Overview
Principal Threats
Our National Security Strategy
Our Economy
Our Diplomacy
Homeland Security
Our Intelligence Community
Our Military
Cyber
Space
China
Russia
North Korea
The Middle East
NATO and Europe
South Asia
South East Asia
Central Asia
The Western Hemisphere
Africa
The High North
Summary
Appendices
A – Financing National Security
B – Force Planning
OVERVIEW
America today finds itself uniquely positioned to lead and prosper in a rapidly evolving world. Our economic and military strength, democratic values, and extensive alliances and partnerships give us great advantages as we seek to protect and advance our economic prosperity and way of life. As the leader of the free world, the United States plays an important role in championing human rights and freedoms around the world. As we have been for many decades, we remain the indispensable nation.
The international security environment we inhabit is by now well understood and familiar. The bipolar system of the Cold War has given way to a more multipolar system featuring a militarily and economically dominant, but not all-powerful, United States; a rising China and India; a resurgent and aggressive Russia; an economically potent but militarily vulnerable Europe; an unstable and violence-prone Middle East, wracked by the Sunni-Shia divide, economic and governance underperformance, and the Palestinian-Israeli problem; a proliferation of weak and failed states, particularly in Africa, the Middle East, and the Russian periphery; and empowered international and nongovernmental organizations and non-state actors. Terrorist organizations and international organized crime are far more significant than in the past, enabled by advanced technology, multi-faceted funding, global communications and information flows. In absolute terms the world is safer, as the prospect of nuclear mutually assured destruction and world war costing millions of lives is lessoned compared to the last century. Yet many societies feel threatened and insecure, while conflict remains endemic.
Principal Threats
Our national security strategy is based on assessing threats to our vital interests, without overestimating or undervaluing them. Because we cannot predict an uncertain future with complete accuracy, the instruments of national power must be capable of addressing a range of threats flexibly and adaptively. The broad security threats that confront us have evolved over time. In order of importance, they can be summarized as:
- Major attacks against the homeland. These could be nuclear, biological, chemical, cyber, or explosive/ kinetic in nature (such as the 9/11 attacks) delivered by states or non-state actors. Single or multiple attacks causing mass casualties could lead to significant social disruption or economic collapse and loss of confidence in our governance structures, imperiling our standard of living and way of life in addition to causing massive loss of life.
- The rise of a hostile peer competitor. Throughout the 20th century America aligned against any great power or coalition able to dominate the Eurasian landmass and pose a direct, existential threat to the continental US, opposing Germany in World War I, Germany and Japan in World War II, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. US opposition to Chinese territorial moves in the East and South China seas can be seen as an attempt to counter the rise of China in a manner consistent with longstanding US grand strategy. Sanctions, active diplomacy, and security assistance and military deployments in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine can be seen in the same light.
- Economic disruption. The health and stability of the US economy is linked in a globalized world to the actions of foreign powers. A major disruption to the global economy (such as closing the Straits of Hormuz or the Straits of Malacca or a major cyberattack on critical financial centers) represents a clear threat. Interruption in the free flow of goods and energy could have serious consequences for the United States, and we will use all the instruments of national power if necessary to ensure economic stability. This must begin at home with rolling back the national debt.
- Direct attacks against key allies. Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and bilateral security arrangements with close allies such as Japan and South Korea constitute solemn commitments that extend American power and influence globally. Allies and partners total some 60 nations, representing most of the world’s economic and military power. To preserve international stability and deter conflict, our formal alliances must be honored and our partnerships nourished. US leaders must act decisively when close allies are directly threatened.
Our National Security Strategy US National Security Strategy is defined as the coordinated use of all instruments of national power to secure American vital interests. National Security Strategy thus rises above particular strategies designed to achieve particular ends. The ends of our strategy, simply stated, are to preserve and protect American vital interests, defined as interests of such overriding importance that, if necessary, we may mobilize and employ all available resources to protect and secure them. US vital interests are long standing and encompass:
- the defense of US territory, the US population and that of our treaty allies
- our constitutional values and forms of government
- our economy and standard of living
The means of our strategy consist of the instruments of national power. America’s power in the national security sphere is grounded in diplomacy, information, economic strength and our military. Harnessing these instruments effectively is the key to successful strategy. Strengthening and maintaining them ensures a safe America. These instruments are enabled by:
- Our democratic values and constitutional forms of government
- A healthy, well-educated population
- A strong and growing economy
- Advanced technology
- A mature and capable industrial base
- A modernized national infrastructure
- Strong alliances and partnerships
- A favorable geographic position with ample natural resources
- Our military institutions and capabilities
How the instruments of national power are combined and employed represent the ways of our National Security Strategy. US national security strategy since the 1950s has been based first and foremost on nuclear deterrence. This will remain the case. This means a survivable nuclear arsenal able to deliver damage great enough to render any first strike by an adversary unimaginable. Though smaller than during the Cold War and requiring modernization, the US strategic nuclear arsenal today is survivable, redundant, and accurate, providing an absolute nuclear deterrent against any adversary. Though the components of our nuclear deterrent will evolve, its capability to deliver a devastating retaliatory response will remain a constant.
For the purposes of statecraft and strategy-making, deterrence is the art of instilling in the mind of an adversary the perception that the costs of a contemplated course of action outweigh the benefits. Here, both capability and credibility are essential. The capability to deliver the threat must exist, but our willingness to deliver the threat must also be seen and believed. If the threatened costs are not seen as unacceptably high, or if there is genuine doubt as to whether the threat will be delivered, deterrence can fail. Since the 1950s, nuclear deterrence has proven to be stable and effective.
Our non-nuclear forces, as well as our economic strength and our diplomacy, provide the basic means for conventional deterrence. For conventional deterrence to be effective, we must possess the unquestioned ability to defeat potential adversaries, and an unquestioned willingness to fully employ our power when vital interests are at stake. In the conventional realm, the first principle is to meet the threat as far from the homeland as possible. Thus, since the end of World War II, the United States has established bases, positioned forces, and stockpiled weapons and munitions around the globe, buttressed by economic, security and development assistance, exercises, formal treaties, coalitions of the willing, and alliances. Counter proliferation may also be viewed in this light. While US forces have repositioned since the end of the Cold War, America’s network of overseas bases, airfields, and alliances as well as forward- deployed air and naval forces is still extensive. The Nation’s ability to project power globally and sustain its forces almost indefinitely remains unmatched. US satellites survey the globe and monitor adversary communications continuously.
Next, the United States prefers to meet serious threats using different tools at once, reserving military force for last and relying on intelligence, diplomacy, forward presence, and our economic power to forestall, deflect, or defuse security challenges. Whenever possible, the United States prefers to address threats in tandem with allies, partners, or like-minded states, working through international organizations such as the United Nations or NATO and conducting pre-conflict engagement and “shaping” operations on a large scale. Yet when vital interests are engaged, the United States will act unilaterally if necessary.
As the preponderant global power, the United States attempts to support the international economic order by providing a global reserve currency, by serving as a lender of last resort, and by enforcing “rules of the game” to foster international economic stability. We use our economic strength and diplomatic influence to prevent or ward off security challenges where we can. When we cannot, and when significant or vital interests are engaged, military force may be used. Historically, the United States experienced clear success when threats to vital interests were unambiguous; when the response enjoyed strong support from the public and Congress; when overwhelming force was applied; when strong allies participated; and when the strategic objective was well understood. Both World War I and II, the Cold War, and the Gulf War are examples. In cases where the direct threat to US vital interests was less clear, overwhelming force was not applied, public and congressional support was not strong or sustained, and the strategic objective was unclear, defeat or stalemate ensued. Korea, Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan are the relevant examples here.
For the near and mid-term, a broad strategic framework emphasizing nuclear deterrence, alliances, forward basing, active diplomacy, and military and economic dominance will remain the foundation of US national security. We cannot forestall, intervene in or prevent all violations of the international order or of international law. But where major powers threaten the international equilibrium and directly threaten our core interests, we must and will act. As in the past, we will strive to contain the rise of any state that poses a direct and compelling threat to our vital interests. We should avoid reckless intervention, but sustained engagement and global leadership are essential to US security and prosperity. As we have seen, a proliferation of failed and failing states and the rise of non-state actors have created political vacuums around the periphery of the former Soviet Union, eastern Congo, South Sudan, large parts of northern Africa, and the Middle East, leading to massive population displacement, loss of life, security threats, terrorism, and instability. As the world’s leading economic and military power, our security and prosperity are linked to an international system that provides order and stability to our allies and partners.
US National Security Strategy is focused on China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, transnational criminal organizations such as the Sinaloa cartel, and violent extremist organizations like ISIS and al Qaeda as the most dangerous threats to national security. US national security will continue to orient on these in the near and midterm. As a global power the US cannot focus only on one region or challenger; such an approach weakens deterrence and risks signaling lesser concern for others that might pose serious risks.
In this regard, containing and deterring adversary states is important. Armed conflict with any should be a last resort. Peaceful economic and diplomatic engagement will remain important and where cooperation and accommodation are mutually beneficial they can be pursued, but never at the expense of our vital interests. Russia in particular has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to use force to violate borders and overturn or set aside international norms. China’s muscular assertion of sovereignty in the East and South China Sea has roiled our traditional partners and allies in the region and called into question US leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. On the Korean Peninsula, an unstable and erratic nuclear regime threatens a fragile peace. Throughout the Middle East, terrorist organizations pose direct threats to the homeland, our European allies and regional states. Iran pursues a hegemonic agenda that is destabilizing the region and fueling sectarian conflict at historically high levels. Transnational criminal organizations exact a staggering toll on the fabric of our society, directly contributing to tens of thousands of deaths annually through illicit drug trafficking.
Other regions such as Latin America and Africa have traditionally enjoyed lower priority but cannot be ignored. In both the rise of more globalized transnational criminal organizations has eroded state control, increased corruption, fueled the drug trade and provoked mass immigration. Terrorist groups have gained a growing foothold, while stable and functioning democracy remains elusive in some quarters. Neither region will assume top priority in US national security policy, but both will require sustained engagement going forward.
When today’s most senior civilian and military leaders began their service, space and cyber began to emerge as distinct domains. Today they are crucial to our national security. Our military is dependent on space for navigation, targeting, communications, and strategic intelligence gathering and early warning. Protection of our information networks (private and public, civilian and military) is a first order priority, as is an offensive capability to target adversary networks. Loss or degradation of these key capabilities offers war-winning advantages to China and Russia in particular. Amid many competing priorities these must be championed.
On many of these fronts, diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments will matter greatly, but hard military power will count as much or more. How much is enough? On the nuclear front, the deterrent force is aging, and continued investments are necessary to preserve the nuclear deterrence going forward. Conventionally, our military remains the most dominant force in the world. At sea and in the air, US forces remain clearly preponderant – particularly when the forces of close allies are factored in. On land, our ground forces require strengthening to execute this national security strategy, which calls for balanced land, sea, and air forces sized to conduct two major conventional campaigns nearly simultaneously. (Since the end of the Cold War this construct has been progressively relaxed) Recent trends show clearly that our defense industrial base requires renewed emphasis and recapitalization. We must also possess a decisive edge in the space and cyber domains. Anything less reduces the United States from a global to a regional power, able to intervene decisively in one location but not in others, impairing deterrence and reassurance of key allies. Post – Cold War trends have also seen the force come home from many of its forward bases. Projecting force from the homeland to distant locations is now the norm, and airlift and sealift as well as prepositioned stocks will remain essential building blocks of American grand strategy.
If all these capabilities are important, what are our true strategic priorities? Effective nuclear deterrence must top the list, along with modernized space, cyber, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and communities. With the majority of our combat forces no longer forward deployed, power projection in the form of strategic sealift and airlift as well as prepositioned stocks must be resourced. To finance these priorities, our acquisition processes, personnel costs, basing structure and organizations must be streamlined and rationalized for maximum efficiency with minimum waste. Some very high priced acquisition programs that are not essential will be curtailed. Redundant capabilities and structures must be eliminated. We must regain control of defense spending and once again deliver national security value for money to the American taxpayer. Congressional support will be essential here.
Our history as a world power suggests that how we secure our vital interests has remained generally consistent over time. Nuclear deterrence, power projection, alliances and partnerships, and overmatching military and economic strength have been and will remain the underpinnings of a coherent grand strategy. How we employ and leverage these instruments of national power to protect, defend, and advance the national interest is, after all, the essence of national security strategy. In a dangerous world, these pillars have provided a strong foundation for national security. If our domestic politics can achieve consensus on future threats and solutions, America is well positioned to lead and prosper in a world that will remain both dangerous and uncertain. As we confront these challenges, our values and respect for human rights and dignity will remain great strengths.
Our Economy
US economic strength is the wellspring of our prosperity, stability and national security. We remain the world’s largest economy with 25% of global GDP. The dollar serves as the world’s reserve currency, dominating all others due to its strength and stability, ensuring its value. In recent years we have become largely energy independent and we continue to be the largest consumer market in the world, with strong consumption spending and low unemployment. We are the world’s leader in capital investment. These strengths enable a high standard of living for our population, significant global economic influence, and a military that is by a wide margin the strongest and most capable on the planet.
These strengths are challenged by high levels of federal government debt (approaching 133% of GDP, the largest since 1945), persistently expanding entitlement spending (which puts strong upward pressure on annual deficits and accumulated debt), high trade deficits and relatively slow economic growth. Our accumulated debt of over $38 trillion is a clear and present danger to national security. Over the next five years, current projections show the interest payments on this debt will be nearly as large as the entire defense budget in size even if interest rates stay at their current levels. Income inequality has been persistent and growing over several decades. Addressing these challenges to boost economic growth, raise wages and ensure a higher standard of living for the American people is at the heart of our national security strategy. A stable and prosperous America is a safer America.
We can improve our economic performance, but solutions will require a disciplined approach. We can begin by putting our federal government fiscal house in order with a comprehensive plan to achieve a balanced budget within 10 years through both curtailing expenditures and enhancing revenues. We will work with the Congress to reign in out of control entitlement spending and to make long-term, meaningful reforms to ensure that Social Security and Medicare are sustainable for the foreseeable future. We will provide incentives for employers, individuals, and health care providers to reduced overall costs of through enhanced competition and options for individuals. With regard to revenue, we will reduce or eliminate tax loopholes that distort sound economic judgement and exacerbate inequality. Federal government expenditures will be scrutinized to minimize waste and to relentlessly focus government on what it is uniquely capable of doing: providing public goods, including major improvements to our infrastructure, which will provide employment, stimulate growth, and enhance business activity. The federal government’s action will lead to greater domestic confidence in the economy, empowering the private sector – the real engine of our economy. We will promote economic growth through reducing excessive regulation that prevents growth and supporting innovation and new start-ups.
Our strategy recognizes that international confidence in the US economy is a critical element of both national and international stability. American influence through economic tools including trade, foreign aid, monetary policy, financial controls, and access to US markets can be extremely effective. A strong and healthy economy underpins national security in other important ways as well, providing leverage and influence using instruments like trade policy, commercial agreements, financial support and economic sanctions to encourage, deter, or punish adversaries and competitors. In this regard, trade deficits should be addressed aggressively and comprehensively – but across-the-board tariffs invite strong retaliation and secondary effects that that can only damage economic growth and consumer prices.
American economic power is not merely an instrument in its own right; it is also the foundation from which the federal budget is resourced. The US economy is the wellspring of US strength and prosperity. We must ensure that economic policies protect this strength by growing the US labor force, increasing the value generation potential of US companies, and reducing annual federal deficits. Our national security depends on it.
Our Diplomacy
Our diplomats will usually be our first and most often used tool. This holds true even during periods of conflict, when the need to marshal international support, deescalate conflict and reestablish peaceful relations is paramount. Diplomacy includes traditional communications and negotiations, but also private diplomacy by unofficial representatives (sometimes referred to as “Track II” diplomacy), official but non-traditional emissaries called upon for especially sensitive missions, and public diplomacy that facilitates popular exchanges of people and ideas for educational purposes.
Given the increasingly complex and dynamic international security environment, the United States requires a vibrant, robust, ongoing, and increasingly capable diplomatic element of national power. The Department of State requires deep functional expertise in the form of language and cultural proficiency, strong skills in areas of regional and global interest (international organizations, economics, persuasive communications, and security affairs), and the organizational flexibility to combine these skills and integrate them seamlessly with other bodies of expertise. Our strategy calls for investments in professional development, including mid-career and senior educational opportunities, to better equip our diplomats for their demanding responsibilities. also our society
US diplomacy is often enhanced by working by, through and with international organizations like the United Nations, NATO, the World Health Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, among others. Given that other powerful states are members, individual outcomes may not always align closely with US policy desires. However, US participation and leadership in these organizations strengthens US influence, builds support, and encourages peaceful collaboration and consensus. Our legitimacy around the world is based in large part on our willingness to promote universal values like individual human rights and the rule of law, cornerstones of an international, rules-based order. International organizations can expand US reach and provide opportunities to resolve conflicts before they occur. While US vital interests must never be sacrificed, we will leverage international organizations as a key part of our diplomatic engagement around the world
Sharpening the diplomatic tool to meet these needs requires reform. Foremost is a renewed emphasis on language and cross-cultural skills. We need diplomats with fluency, cross-cultural understanding, and contacts abroad. The Department needs to reinforce these basic prerequisites for effective diplomacy before its officers assume broader responsibilities later in their careers. Accordingly, our strategy calls for adjusting assignment policies to ensure deep regional expertise as the foundation for future Foreign Service Officers. Going forward, career patterns for our diplomats will focus on specific regions and not generalist assignments.
Our diplomats also need resources and authorities to better integrate activities across government organizations. We must educate and equip our diplomats to lead and employ interagency teams to work international problems that cut across national boundaries, functional areas and organizational barriers. Experienced, senior Department of State personnel will often lead these teams, and they need experiences outside of traditional diplomatic settings. Therefore, as was done with the Goldwater Nichols military reforms of the 1980s, we will require senior diplomats to serve in interagency postings outside of the Department of State as a precondition for promotion to the highest ranks.
The information domain is another diplomatic capability requiring emphasis. In a world dominated by social media and globalized information flows, we are falling behind. Our adversaries deploy advanced information capabilities to great effect, and we must compete in and dominate this critical arena. Consequently, the National Security Strategy calls for reviving a modernized US Information Agency (USIA) as an integral component of the Department of State, with a dedicated career field specializing in public diplomacy. USIA will play a pivotal role in advancing US foreign policy and national security goals by providing accurate and truthful information around the world as a counter to government-sponsored propaganda and disinformation efforts by our adversaries.
Foreign assistance and development are also powerful tools to alleviate suffering, promote democratic governance and economic growth and progress, and enhance America’s standing and influence around the globe – all of which contribute to our security. We must be careful, however, to ensure that taxpayer dollars are used in ways that directly contribute to our goals and objectives. To better align our foreign development goals and programs with our national security objectives and our diplomacy, our strategy calls for reintegrating the US Agency for International Development (USAID) with its $19B budget into the Department of State as a separate activity reporting to the Secretary. (This change would not merge foreign service officer and USAID career fields).
The reactivation of USIA and the reincorporation of USAID into the Department of State will require adjustments in the Department’s annual budget, which will be increased to $65B..
Homeland Security Created in response to the 9/11 attacks, the Department of Homeland Security today oversees 22 agencies with 240,000 employees and a $62B budget. Its stated missions include anti-terrorism, border security, immigration and customs, cyber security, and disaster prevention and management. Along with other government agencies, DHS has effectively defended against terrorist attacks for over a generation, but low morale and limited success in stopping illegal immigration and the drug trade are chronic problems. Given the vast scope of its responsibilities and its many subordinate activities, DHS is challenged to meet its many missions despite a large workforce and budget. To improve its performance, DHS should not dive deeper into the day-to-day activities of its many diverse agencies. Rather, it must strengthen its capacity to share information, improve coordination across the homeland security enterprise, and nest its operations within the broader interagency framework. This strategy calls for a much stronger whole-of-government approach, led by DHS, to confront drug trafficking, illegal immigration and disaster relief – while maintaining a sharp focus on cyber defense and anti-terrorism. Joint operations with DoD and the Departments of State and Justice, as well as state and local authorities, on a larger and more comprehensive scale will be required. The strategy supports an increase of 10,000 personnel in the US Border Police and Drug Enforcement Administration. We will also work with Congress to address the problem of fragmented oversight (more than 100 committees and subcommittees currently share this function). For 2026 the DHS budget will increase to $65B.
Our Intelligence Community
In recent decades our intelligence community, incorporating 18 different agencies or activities, has been beset by poor coordination and politicized assessments, as well as poor human intelligence. Legislative direction to “improve coordination and deconflict operations” between various intelligence stovepipes has not been wholly successful. More often than not the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of Central Intelligence have been rivals, not colleagues, contributing to intelligence surprises and failures like the collapse of the Afghan government in 2021, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the outbreak of large-scale conflict in Israel and Gaza in 2023 and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in 2024. In providing intelligence support to the National Command Authority there is no place for partisan or political influence in analysis or intelligence products. This strategy seeks to improve the performance of the intelligence community by empowering the DNI as single-mission manager, with stronger coordinating authorities over all intelligence activities; reducing or eliminating redundant activities; replacing political appointees with tenured career intelligence professionals; fostering deeper regional and functional expertise among intelligence officers vice generalist career patterns; requiring service with the National Intelligence Council (NIC) as a prerequisite for promotion to senior executive ranks; flattening organizations to encourage collaboration and initiative; investing in and prioritizing human intelligence in foreign posts and stations; prioritizing Open Source Intelligence (OSI); embracing cutting edge technology such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing; and by recruiting and incentivizing the very best human capital. For 2026, the proposed budget for the IC (less the Military Intelligence Program) is $70B.
Our Military
Though intended as a tool of last resort, our military forces are the center of gravity of our national security strategy. Our strategy must support forces that are sized, trained, equipped and maintained at readiness levels that enable them to meet our strategic requirements. The overriding principle is strategic balance, with our nuclear forces, at sea, in the air, on land, and in the space and cyber domains, that provide strong deterrence and, should deterrence fail, the ability to fight and win joint campaigns. The defense budget has increased over the past 15 years, from $534B in FY2010 to $627B in FY 2015 to $850B in FY2025, approximately 3.2% of GDP, a level ten percent higher than the amount spent at the height of the Vietnam War or at the height of the Reagan military buildup. While it is vital to sustain global commitments, readiness, modernization, and the All-Volunteer Force, defense budgets must be stabilized over the next five years to a sustainable but still robust level of spending of $800B per year or 3% of GDP (including overseas contingency operations (OCO)). Given interest on the national debt and mandated entitlement spending, higher defense spending is unsustainable.
Our national security strategy is focused on providing trained and ready forces sufficient to deter nuclear conflict altogether, and to deter or prevail in major conventional conflict in two different theaters nearly simultaneously. It acknowledges that strategic surprises or “shocks” are more likely than not. Therefore we must expect and prepare for uncertainty with robust, balanced forces that can fight and win across the full spectrum of conflict, with high intensity conflict – the most dangerous conventional scenario – a clear priority. Our forces must be flexible enough to rapidly deploy and to cope with hybrid or “gray zone” scenarios that take place just below the level of armed conflict. But they must be strong enough to overwhelm potential adversaries in rapid and decisive campaigns. In the future we will avoid long, drawn out conflicts fought with inadequate resources.
The Joint Force Our strategy supports ongoing initiatives to empower the Joint Staff as a global integrator of our military forces across Combatant Command areas of responsibility, without compromising the Secretary of Defense’s statutory authorities. While we have made strides in improving jointness since enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation in 1986, we must do more to improve the level of joint interoperability between the military services. The goal is to field joint forces that are trained, equipped and postured to achieve synergistic effects on the battlefield that are more than the sum of individual service components. This strategy contemplates no changes in the Unified Command Plan at this time.
In recent conflicts, we did not always support our theater commanders by placing service components under unified joint command. Our C4ISR systems were not always interoperable. At home station, joint training opportunities were limited, forcing units from different services to learn to cooperate effectively on the battlefield. Concerns for service autonomy at times were allowed to take took precedence over true joint operations. We will aggressively tackle these issues to improve our ability to conduct joint operations and better support our joint warfighters, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the JCS and the Joint Staff in the lead. Accordingly, the strategy calls for all directives from the National Command Authority to be transmitted through the Chairman and the Joint Staff to the Combatant Commanders.
Nuclear Forces The performance and capability of America’s strategic nuclear force is our first national security priority. To this end, we will modernize our existing land based and sea based strategic nuclear forces to ensure their reliability and capability, and add capabilities at the tactical nuclear level to strengthen deterrence. By 2030 we will phase out the bomber leg of the nuclear triad, retaining an 1100-warhead force of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles. (This force is survivable and capable of inflicting unacceptable damage to adversaries, rendering nuclear bombers redundant) To enhance deterrence and provide options below the strategic level, we will selectively field nuclear-capable cruise missile systems and retain dual-capable fighter squadrons at current levels. We will support continued investment and modernization of our national labs and nuclear command and control infrastructure to ensure the reliability and credibility of our nuclear deterrent far into the future. Nuclear arms control and counter-proliferation programs will be fully resourced and supported.
Conventional Forces Our land, sea and air forces are the best in the world, but we are out of balance, with strong air and maritime forces but ground forces that are too small and poorly equipped to execute our strategy. Our forces will be sized, trained and equipped to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater campaigns. Since 9/11, staffs and headquarters have proliferated alarmingly, drawing manpower and resources away from the fighting forces and increasing their administrative burdens. Officer inventories across the services will decline accordingly by 30% and all agencies and activities created after 9/11 will be shut down unless deemed key and essential. Flying and steaming hours and training ammunition have been short-changed despite generous defense budgets. Acquisition costs have skyrocketed while many newly fielded systems are too costly and difficult to maintain and operate. Compared to our most likely adversaries we are far behind in developing and fielding unmanned platforms at the scale required by modern high intensity warfare. Stocks of precision-guided munitions and critical classes of supply are inadequate for the consumption rates we can expect on today’s battlefield. Adequate reserves and the machinery for mass mobilization if required are urgently needed. All of these challenges will be addressed as priorities.
On land, our forces are undersized for their likely missions and lack the field artillery, air defense and electronic warfare capabilities urgently required today. Too many of the Army’s Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) are light infantry, without the firepower, mobility and protection needed to survive and win against peer opponents. The national security strategy calls for expanding the Army from 10 to 12 fully manned and equipped divisions, converting six Stryker BCTs into Armor BCTs. We will strengthen the Army’s artillery, short range air defense and electronic warfare communities and upgrade Army unmanned platforms at scale. Beginning in 2026 the Army will assume the Close Air Support mission with fixed wing assets (the A-10) transferred from the Air Force. To better enable airspace management and deconfliction, we will also transfer the high altitude air and missile defense mission and assets from the Army to the Air Force.
Our Air Force will be postured to quickly gain and maintain air supremacy in nearly simultaneous major theater campaigns and to support the Joint Force decisively from the air. We will continue to field the F-35 in all three variants (including USN and USMC platforms) through FY2026, giving us a potent inventory of some 830 low observable/stealth aircraft to penetrate and disrupt advanced adversary air defense systems. Organized in 54 fighter squadrons and six bomb wings, these aircraft, as well as our legacy fighter and bomber force, will carry us through 2040. Flying hours, spare parts and resolving maintenance backlogs will receive priority. Concurrently we will accelerate research, development and fielding of unmanned, high performance aircraft to fully leverage America’s advanced technology advantage.
At sea, our Navy and Marine Corps will ensure our access to the Global Commons, provide forward presence and sea control, and contribute maritime forces to ensure success in two nearly concurrent major theater campaigns. We will increase the size of the battle fleet to 308 warships, built around 11 nuclear-powered super carriers, with increased funding for maintenance, precision guided munitions, and spare parts. We will also restore armor and field artillery to the Marine Corps and add one infantry regiment. Navy R&D will also focus on unmanned surface and undersea platforms that will enable the future maritime force to survive and prevail against very long range, satellite-guided ballistic missile threats. Driving down ship construction costs is a critical necessity if we are to achieve this desired end state.
Cyber
Our National Security Strategy also enhances our defensive and offensive cyber capacities by providing additional resources for the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ)/FBI. Because of the importance of cyber operations to both the economy and the governance of our country, we must continue to work together to protect our critical infrastructure, work with the private sector to assist them in security, secure federal networks, provide an educated workforce that understands cyber functions, and engage with international partners.
The Department of Defense defends DOD networks, defends the US homeland and US national interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence and provides cyber support to military operational and contingency plans. DHS secures the federal networks, protects critical infrastructure, provides cyber incident response, coordinates cybersecurity education, and leads government information sharing with the private sector. The Department of Justice and the FBI fight cyber-crime. In recent years, our adversaries have conducted serious cyber-attacks against our government and cyber infrastructure with little fear of retaliation. Chinese penetration of our networks, both government and commercial, is a major threat, followed by Russian, Iranian and North Korea cyber intrusions. Going forward, we reserve the right to employ our cyber capabilities offensively if attacked, and we will prioritize a strong and adaptive offensive cyber capability. Only in this way can an adequate cyber deterrence regime exist.
In this effort, we will resource major cyber actors to upgrade their physical infrastructure and to recruit, train, educate and retain a competent cyber workforces. The cybersecurity workforce will continue to professionalize based on the National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework, while the general population requires universal education on cyber hygiene, which would significantly decrease vulnerability to popular (and numerous) cyber-attacks such as phishing. Closer relations between the US federal, state and local governments as well as the private sector will allow the US to mobilize the resources latent in our national cyber system.
Space
The space domain constitutes a critical warfighting arena that is essential for navigation, communications, intelligence and surveillance, and targeting. Our anti-ballistic missile systems also engage and defeat enemy targets in above-atmospheric altitudes. The ability to deploy and defend our space-based systems is fundamental to our national security. Accordingly, we will conduct a Space Posture Review in 2026. Our strategy calls for capabilities to defend critical satellite and other space-based platforms from attack; to deter enemy “hard kill” and “soft kill” space operations with defensive and offensive space systems; to leverage military and commercial space agencies to replace damaged or destroyed friendly space systems; and to precisely monitor all space vehicles to allow for discrete space operations in peace and war. Our military services in particular must also be trained and equipped to communicate, navigate, collect and target without access to space as a hedge against any enemy technological breakthrough or success that might limit our access to space for national security reasons.
For 2026 the budget for the Department of Defense is set at $850B.
Regional Threats and Challenges
China
American interests in the Indo-Pacific region are critical and include the defense of treaty partners Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines; peaceful and mutually advantageous trade relations (the region generates more than a quarter of all global economic activity); freedom of navigation; counter-proliferation; and the promotion of global norms and values such as human rights, democracy and good governance. The US has been a major regional partner and actor in the region for well over a century and will continue to be so far into the future. China represents a major trading partner and peaceful economic relations based on fair and equitable trade can be a major benefit to both nations. We do not seek military competition or confrontation with a rising China. Any conflict can only threaten the economic stability and prosperity of the region and the world. However, the dramatic increase in China’s nuclear and conventional capabilities and its aggressive challenges to the sovereignty of its neighbors and freedom of navigation in international waters pose grave concerns. Any direct challenge to US vital interests will merit a firm response through the coordinated use of all the instruments of our national power. Those interests include a free and democratic Taiwan.
America’s interests are global and, while we do not prioritize Asia to the exclusion of Europe or other regions, we recognize that our stability and prosperity is tied to our relations with the Indo -Pacific region. Those relationships have been challenged by aggressive Chinese military action in the East and South China Seas, and by trade practices that harm US consumers and workers. The buildup of Chinese military power and the assertion of Chinese sovereignty far from its borders, in violation of international law and norms, threatens to destabilize the entire region. The rapid increase in Chinese military spending and the increasing technological sophistication of Chinese weapons systems also raises the level of threat. We will continue to oppose any attempt to incorporate Taiwan by force. We remain committed to defending our treaty partners with forward deployed and reinforcing military forces. but require them to enhance their own defense capabilities to match our commitments. In conjunction with allies and partners, we ensure freedom of navigation and access to the global commons in the Indo- Pacific region and will not accept any restrictions that do not comply with international law.
Russia
While not an overt adversary, the Russian Federation presents a potential existential threat to America. With the world’s largest and strongest nuclear arsenal, and constantly engaged in warfare on its periphery, Russia represents a first order national security priority, on par with China. In recent years Russian aggression in Georgia, Crimea, Ukraine and Syria demonstrate its readiness to ignore international norms and to use force to achieve its objectives. Russia’s powerful military, continued aggression in Ukraine and willingness to challenge US interests around the globe constitute a grave national security threat.
In Ukraine, we will continue to provide major funding and military support in concert with allies and partners, to include high performance aircraft, multiple launch rocket systems, and main battle tanks. We support Ukraine’s efforts to defend its national territory and sovereignty and to recover all occupied territories. We do not seek armed conflict with the Russian Federation, but our commitment to support our treaty allies and partners will remain unquestioned. We will not support negotiations that reward Russian aggression and continued occupation of Ukrainian territory.
We will continue to lead and support NATO and to partner in the defense of all NATO allies in accordance with the Washington Treaty. In particular, the Baltic States face pressure from Russian “gray zone” activities intended to threaten and destabilize their sovereignty; we will proceed with active measures to strengthen NATO defenses there. Economic sanctions will remain in force accordingly. US military forces will remain in Europe at current levels to deter Russian aggression on NATO territory. Finally, we will meet Russian threats to use nuclear weapons in conventional scenarios with the full force of our nuclear deterrent. While we are committed to peaceful relations with the Russian Federation, any engagement will not come at the expense of our allies and partners or our national interests.
North Korea
For 70 years the US alliance with the Republic of Korea has succeeded in deterring the North Korean regime from attempting to reunify the peninsula by force of arms. This alliance has been severely challenged in recent years by a succession of hostile and aggressive acts by the North Korean regime and by its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, which threaten its neighbors and the stability of the region as a whole. We remain committed to the defense of the Republic of Korea and to the eventual, peaceful reunification of the peninsula. We will remain forward deployed to deter any North Korean aggression against the south, and the full weight of the US military will be brought to bear in the event of North Korean hostilities against our treaty partners. We will continue the deployment of Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems and other ballistic missile defense capabilities to protect our allies against the threat of North Korean missiles. Should North Korea threaten or employ nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against the Republic of Korea or Japan, our nuclear deterrent will be brought to bear in their defense. Our strategy aims to strengthen deterrence and the defense of the ROK, to maintain and where necessary increase external economic pressure to preclude future nuclear and missile tests, and to keep the door open to diplomacy and dialogue with all parties, including China.
The Middle East
US interests in the Middle East center on protecting the homeland from terrorism emanating from the region; the free flow of energy to world markets (critical to assuring economic stability); the defense and security of key partners like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf States; and regional stability that prevents destabilizing refugee flows across and out of the region. These interests have been challenged in recent years by a number of factors: the rise of Iran and a resulting Sunni-Shia divide that has progressively destabilized the region; a proliferation of failed states and poor governance that has fueled religious extremism and terrorism; and an intractable Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Across the region, fragile states like Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen provide havens for violent extremist organizations that threaten regional neighbors and foreign powers alike.
Our strategy does not assume that the US can address and overcome the root causes of regional instability. We cannot “fix” the social and economic problems that drive much of the violence and terrorism that characterizes the region, though our economic assistance and development efforts will continue where prudent and feasible. Massive military interventions following 9/11 failed to achieve enduring solutions and we will not deploy large ground formations to the region except when faced with critical challenges to vital interests. If required to do so, we will employ a “whole of government” approach, leverage partner military forces, and commit the forces and resources necessary to achieve rapid and decisive outcomes.
Our approach to the region will focus on supporting key regional partners and allies – strategic “anchor points” – like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Egypt and Turkey with foreign and military assistance, intelligence, trainers and security sector reform. We will continue to base strong air and naval forces in the region as well as rotational special operations forces. Our strategy calls for containing Iranian hegemony and expansion, with an unequivocal commitment to freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Bab el Mandeb. As a state sponsor of terrorism, Iran exercises malign influence throughout the region through the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps “Quds Force,” which we have designated as a foreign terrorist organization. Its surrogates – Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis – are prime agents seeking to destabilize the region and strengthen Iranian influence. In concert with partners in the region, we will use all instruments of national power to oppose their activities.
Our strategy calls for containing Iran and its proxies through diplomatic, economic and if necessary military means, and for strengthening long standing partnerships in the region. We will closely monitor Iran’s nuclear program and will, in concert with allies and partners, respond strongly to any attempt to develop, field or employ a nuclear weapon. We will tolerate no territorial aggrandizement by Iran at the expense of its neighbors.
Coalition operations in Iraq and Syria to defeat extremist organizations have largely succeeded. We will continue to provide air, SOF, intelligence and other forms of combat support to local forces as they fight to eradicate remnants. We remain committed to the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria and to an early cessation of hostilities so that humanitarian assistance and a return to normalcy can begin. We will not support efforts that seek to dispossess others from their traditional territories, and therefore fuel enduring civil strife. We will not support the partition of Arab states or the empowerment of sub-state actors. We will work with regional governments as well as our coalition partners to complete the defeat of violent extremist organizations and to reestablish national territories, with all ethnic and religious groups afforded basic human rights under the rule of law. Where regional actors such as Iran seek to challenge our core interests, we will respond decisively using all instruments, including military force.
Israel: US commitment to the security of Israel remains unshakeable. Our strategy calls for continuing economic and security support to Israel at current levels, while we remain key sponsors of a two state solution that affords eventual independence to a peaceful, internationally recognized Palestine. This solution is dependent upon a viable Palestinian partner that is prepared to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist and that renounces violence as a tool towards statehood, as well as Israel’s willingness to trade land for peace and guaranteed security. We will work with partners in the region to support and facilitate confidence-building measures to bring the two parties towards an agreement. We stand ready to support international efforts to monitor such agreements, to include participating in international peacekeeping missions if requested by the parties and approved by the United Nations.
Europe and NATO
For many reasons, the transatlantic partnership remains vital to our national security and to supporting US national interests. The EU and the United States, two of the three largest economies in the world, are each other’s largest trading partners in goods and services and represent more than a third of global GDP, while the NATO alliance is by far the strongest military alliance in the world; 31 of our 37 treaty allies around the world are found in Europe. European values, interests and concerns are very similar to our own. Trade with Europe enables US prosperity, while security and intelligence cooperation allows the US to fight terrorists around the world. Diplomatic partnerships result in European partners reliably supporting US efforts at the United Nations and in other global and regional forums. NATO has been the most successful military alliance in history and supports transatlantic security goals around the world. Europeans are full partners in US-led efforts to counter terrorism and in countering Russian aggression.
Today Europe faces challenges unprecedented since the Cold War. Our strategy calls for continued cooperation with European partners and allies, including the European Union, in deterring Russian aggression and malign activities, countering terrorism, and countering transnational criminal threats. Our commitment to the Washington Treaty and to collective defense remains absolute. However, our allies must commit to responsible burden sharing and they must improve readiness, at present a serious vulnerability. Our vital national security interests require that the US engage in demonstrable and effective leadership of NATO as the North Atlantic Community’s principal security provider and we will continue to fulfill that role.
Additionally, we need to help our European friends with threats that affect them, such as large-scale refugee flows. The security of our eastern European allies depends on the reality of NATO capability to provide collective defense. We will work with our NATO allies to ensure that the alliance is fully resourced via agreed upon cost-sharing formula, that our allies bear a fair share of the costs of collective defense, that cohesion is maintained, and that alliance forces are trained and ready. We will continue our support for the European Deterrence Initiative, NATO Enhanced Forward Presence, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. We will also continue to work with NATO in support of its core missions of crisis management and cooperative security.
South Asia
The United States has three major national security interests in South Asia. First, we must prevent terrorist safe havens, especially for al Qaeda and ISIS. Second, we must reduce the risks from nuclear weapons proliferation within the region and the potential loss of nuclear weapons material to known or potential adversaries, including terrorist groups. Third, we must work in good faith to prevent open conflict between Pakistan and India, both of whom possess large nuclear inventories.
Mitigating the risks to these vital US national security interests requires a sustained partnership with Pakistan based on an end to sanctuary and support for insurgent and terrorist groups inside Pakistan. For many years we provided large subsidies to Pakistan in the form of military and development assistance. In the future we will insist on greater conditionality and accountability. Pakistan will receive our assistance on the condition that it moves to curb jihadist militant groups threatening peace and stability between India and Pakistan by militant activities in Jammu-Kashmir and within India itself. We will insist that Pakistan more vigorously counters global terrorist organizations and encourage both restraint in the growth of its nuclear weapons arsenal and responsible behavior with those nuclear weapons already on hand.
At the same time, our strategy seeks to engage positively with the rise of India. We must actively encourage India’s rise as a stable liberal democracy and an international security stakeholder. India’s emerging military strength and diplomatic confidence complements our efforts to support free trade, liberal commerce, human rights and the peaceful resolution of grievances in the Indo-Pacific region. However, India’s role as an energy market for Russia is an obstacle to improved relations we must and will address through diplomacy, including sanctions if necessary. We will expand upon already-accelerating bilateral defense and security initiatives with long-time US partner states in the Indo-Pacific region.
Our withdrawal from Afghanistan requires that we maintain an intelligence focus and over-the-horizon presence able to strike high value targets that threaten the homeland or other key strategic interests. We will sustain our commitment and the overall posture of our military forces in the region to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a terrorist safe haven.
South East Asia
While we seek a calming of tensions in Asia, our friends and partners in the region have become increasingly alarmed at China’s military buildup and assertion of territorial rights far from its shores. Today China dominates the region economically and militarily in ways that threaten US interests and access. Our national interests in South East Asia are focused on containing the PRC, freedom of navigation and access to the Global Commons (especially the Straits of Malacca), economic stability and free trade, countering terrorism, and supporting our allies and partners. American economic and military power play a key role in the region and we will continue to engage with friendly powers in the region along traditional lines, with special emphasis on treaty partners Australia, the Philippines and Thailand. Along with Japan and Korea they remain the foundation of the US strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific region and need appropriate high-level attention. At the same time, the alliance structure is evolving toward a more open system, with new security partnerships forming across the region. As the threat of Chinese aggression rises, the United States will expand security and economic cooperation with allies and partners and promote regional security cooperation on issues of common concern.
Central Asia
With the ending of the war in Afghanistan, our interests in Central Asia are focused on helping to prevent political instability in the region, drug trafficking, the rise of violent extremism, and the future stability of Afghanistan as well as assured access to the region to support our ongoing interests and missions there. The “great game” of competition between Russia and China for influence in Central Asia does not directly engage US core interests at this time. China has made substantial investments in infrastructure, in its effort both to connect Central Asia to Chinese markets and to extract needed resources by overland routes to hedge against the vulnerabilities posed by the sea lanes. Central Asia’s trade with China has already surpassed its trade with Russia. Meanwhile, Russia seeks continued influence in its former territories, continues to maintain security relationships with the region, and will persist in trying to make the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) into an important institution. Russia effectively leverages the softer power of language and institutions – Russian remains an official language in three of the states, and Russian-language news is the region’s principle source of news of the world. Russia also maintains influence in the security services of the region, and three states belong to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) led by Russia.
Chinese and Russian interests are not necessarily at odds, since both powers place a high value on stability in the region and are cooperating extensively in Ukraine. These states will, to some extent, balance each other, as China is reluctant to become involved in security affairs while Russia appears unable to deliver meaningful economic development by itself. Of the two, Chinese interests more clearly support Central Asian states’ interests, as China is bringing investment and connectivity to a long-isolated region that cannot prosper or break out of isolation without the influence of a powerful external actor. Our key interest is to reduce Central Asia’s economic isolation and promote stability as the best bulwark against extremism.
The Western Hemisphere
While not considered the most serious national security threat, the Western Hemisphere is our neighborhood and its stability is an important national interest. Canada and Mexico are our largest trading partners; our combined GDP exceeds that of the 27 European Union members as well as the PRC. However, the US long-term goal of a hemisphere that is democratic and supportive of free markets remains a work in progress. Our neighbors and partners are challenged by globalized transnational criminal networks that thrive in an environment of weak governance, chronic corruption, and the most unequal distribution of wealth in the world. Disturbingly, there are growing trends of collusion between criminal organizations and terrorist groups.
These factors all combine to generate the highest levels of violence on the planet; with approximately 15 percent of the world’s population, the Western Hemisphere produces 40 percent of the homicides. The combination of the lack of economic opportunities and elevated levels of criminality and violence have the net effect of provoking migration flows northward. These flows represent a major security, economic and political challenge we must tackle and solve. Our strategy calls for strengthened engagement to help address deeply rooted causes of weak governance in our shared neighborhood. A relatively modest but continuous investment in building partner capacity in support of political and security institutions can contribute to long term solutions. At the same time, we must take steps to control illegal immigration across our southern border, both through stronger and more thorough border control and by working closely with our neighbors. In coordination with host nation governments, we will take action – including use of military force where necessary – to confront the transnational criminal organizations that drive illegal immigration, human trafficking and the drug trade.
We will continue to work with our hemispheric partners to promote effective levels of governance, in particular providing support to the rule of law, the judiciary, accountable national security organizations, and institutional resilience across the functions of government. In places where democracy is absent or under threat – most notably Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti and Venezuela – we will partner with and assist pro-democracy forces; we will not encourage or enable those who would deny basic democratic freedoms and the rule of law to their citizens. Although the region will not become a top international security concern, our continued engagement is important to hemispheric stability and the national security of the United States.
Africa
Challenges to American interests in Africa are largely indirect. Exploding populations, weak institutions of governance and the rule of law, endemic corruption and the proliferation of armed militias and Islamist terrorist groups conspire to destabilize the region and export instability beyond the borders of the continent. The lack of economic opportunity and low standards of living are prime drivers of violence. Today, Nigeria struggles with Boko Haram, Kenya and Somalia grapple with al Shabab, and the Sahel is afflicted by al Qaeda in the Maghreb and Ansar al Dine. We recognize that these challenges will require a holistic view of security to mitigate.
The current policy of relying on programs and partners that promote US policy goals of democratization, the rule of law, and economic growth to promote stability is fundamentally sound. We believe US security policy is best served by cultivating legitimate institutions and regional bodies that enhance good governance. We will empower regional efforts through support of the African Union and other international and regional organizations – when those efforts are conducted in good faith and in accordance with international law. We will not, however, engage with corrupt or criminal regimes acting in opposition to US interests.
The US stands ready to support pan-regional security endeavors, by promoting security sector reform and accountability, and engaging in law enforcement training, and establishing multi-year funding authorities for assistance programs to demonstrate consistent, reliable American commitment to regional stability. We will continue to rely upon and expand AFRICOM’s role as an interlocutor among regional partners and emphasize deeper interagency communication to promote enhanced synchronization of efforts. We also recognize that an improved relationship with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations will strengthen the many peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations currently active throughout the continent.
The High North
The Arctic is no longer the quiet region it has been for the last 25 years. The changing climate has sparked a growing security competition among the regional nations and simultaneously offers the promise of yet untapped economic opportunity. Our strategy aims to engage with the diverse regional stakeholders to prevent regional hegemony or coercion, and ensure economic prosperity through the protection of the global commons. We will seek to prevent either Russia or China from dominating the European Arctic sub-region militarily or economically. Dominance by either power would undercut US and influence, commitments to regional allies, and put at risk US interests. We will also work to prevent environmental disaster by continuing to build on existing shipping protocols, fisheries management, and oil spill prevention and response. Finally, we will foster responsible private sector investment by providing loan guarantees, tax incentives, or access to government climate and geological data in exchange for private sector investments in necessary infrastructure in the High North.
Recognizing that the High North lacks an appropriate forum to engage relevant actors on security and political concerns, the United States will propose an Arctic Forum to discuss political and security concerns with an immediate focus on transparency and confidence-building measures. Environmental, economic, and scientific discussions will continue to be left to the Arctic Council and the recently created Arctic Economic Council. We will also work with Nordic allies and partners to develop a Northern European security architecture that complements NATO efforts.
Finally, we will prioritize the growth of both civilian and military capabilities to operate in the North American and European Arctic sub-regions. Our focus will be on affordable capabilities such as sensors for domain awareness, communications to coordinate search and rescue and sea and air traffic, and surface ships to demonstrate a robust maritime presence in the region. We will continue to prioritize the construction of additional US Coast Guard icebreakers, and ice-capable US Navy surface ships.
Summary
This National Security Strategy provides both a strategic framework and a budget roadmap that will enable us to secure and advance our core interests in a dangerous world. It harnesses all the instruments of national power and defines the ways by which they can be employed in the national interest. At the core of our strategy is our values – our Constitution, the rule of law, the democratic process, and our regard for human rights and dignity. These we will promote, encourage and support not by force, but by our example, our diplomacy and our actions.
We seek a world at peace. We covet no additional territory or resources. A stable international security environment is in our interest and as we have for decades, we will use our power and influence in the service of peace and prosperity, first for the American people, but also for our friends and allies, and for the world. To this end we will work for fair trade practices, respect for international legal norms, and peaceful resolution when conflicts arise. When our core interests and values are challenged, we will – with our friends and partners where possible, but unilaterally if we must – engage American power and the full range of our economic, diplomatic and if necessary, military instruments to meet the challenge.
America occupies a unique place in history. No other nation possesses the economic and military power, buttressed by strong and stable constitutional and democratic values, that gives us our leading position in the world. With this power comes heavy responsibilities, to the American people, and to the community of nations. Our moral example is an important source of strength; as President Reagan said, “we must be a beacon … a light of freedom throughout the world.” This freedom begins at home, with a strong, safe, prosperous America.
APPENDIX A – Financing National Security
Financing National Security US national security budgets in the future depend, in part, on economic policies that both increase incentives for growth of the US economy and address the challenges of the long-term fiscal debt. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen aptly observed, “The single biggest threat to national security is our debt.” The nation’s civilian and military leaders must recognize the importance of and must advocate for policies to improve economic growth and responsibly address American fiscal challenges.
Overall Federal Spending Defense is disproportionately dependent on Federal budget policy because defense spending represents the largest discretionary portion of the budget. As shown below, most of the Federal budget consists in debt service and providing entitlements established by law – some two-thirds of the Federal budget. Any meaningful policy solutions to Federal budget challenges must include entitlement reform.
The defense budget will face increasing pressure in the next four years from other competing requirements for Federal spending, such as higher interest payments, increased Social Security and Medicare payments for retiring baby boomers, expanded Medicaid entitlements and bolstered funding for homeland security and domestic priorities. The best way to more effectively provide for the Nation’s defense will not be new weapons, but rather support of comprehensive, long-term entitlement and budget reform.
Fiscal Year 2025 Federal Spending
Budget Solutions will entail some kind of realistic long-term entitlement reform, a reduction in discretionary spending, an increase in total tax revenue raised, or a combination of these three. Most bipartisan plans maintain or reduce tax rates while eliminating tax loopholes so that the ultimate result is more tax revenues through greater productive output and less manipulation of the tax code to favor specific actions, industries, or sectors of the economy.
Reform of the defense budget, representing half of all discretionary spending, must play a significant part in solving the Federal budget challenges. Although defense spending has been higher in other historical periods, we currently spend more than the next nine nations combined, including Russia and China. However, even with defense budgets at Cold War levels, we have far fewer deployable forces and units than formerly. Principal cost drivers include rising personnel costs (primarily due to high officer overhead and health care costs), the proliferation of staffs and headquarters, the continuation of military installations we no longer need, and increasingly expensive, and in some cases unneeded, acquisition programs. We will address all four cost drivers, both to restore discipline and tight financial controls to defense budgets, and to free resources we need to strengthen our fighting forces.
Given these fiscal realities, we will take specific steps. First, we will reduce personnel costs by reforming healthcare costs and reducing inflated officer inventories across the force. We will downsize or eliminate headquarters that sap the fighting strength of our military formations, and we will reduce leader-to-led ratios and our inventory of General and Flag Officers to pre-9/11 levels. We will urge the Congress to close unneeded and redundant military installations. We will undertake to reduce the DOD civilian workforce by 20% over the next five years, and we will review all major program acquisitions to ensure that we fund none that are not directly and clearly essential for national defense. The goal is to limit the annual defense budget to $800B, while still funding increases in force structure we need to execute our national security strategy. Hard choices about force structure, basing and program acquisitions will be required. More importantly, we must restrain entitlement spending which, if unchecked, will eventually prevent rational defense budgeting altogether as federal discretionary spending dries up.
APPENDIX B – Military Force Planning
The National Security Strategy calls for military forces able to deter effectively in both nuclear and conventional scenarios, and to fight and win should deterrence fail. Our strategic nuclear forces must be able to survive an adversary’s first strike and deliver a devastating response sufficient to incapacitate the attacker. Our space and cyber forces must ensure dominance in those key domains. Our conventional forces must be capable of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous major theater campaigns. This force-shaping construct will result, over the next four years, in a force consisting of 3 ICBM missile wings, 12 Trident ballistic missile submarines, 12 active Army divisions, three Marine Expeditionary Forces, 11 carrier groups, 54 active and reserve fighter squadrons (USAF) and 6 bomb wings. US Special Operations Forces will see modest reductions of five Special Forces Groups, the Ranger Regiment, six SEAL Teams, 15 USAF Special Operations squadrons, and the Joint Special Operations Command. For planning purposes, a “one major theater campaign” joint force will consist of six Army divisions (three heavy and three light), one Marine Expeditionary Force, twenty fighter squadrons, two bomb wings, two Special Forces Groups, one ranger battalion and four carrier task forces with supporting surface and submarine combatants. One Marine Expeditionary Force (augmented by the USMC Reserve 4th Marine Division and Air Wing), 27 Army National Guard brigade combat teams, one Special Forces Group, one ranger battalion, 14 fighter squadrons, three carrier task forces and two bomber wings will constitute the strategic reserve. A revitalized defense industrial base and efficient machinery to generate reserves, including detailed planning for a return to the draft if necessary, are essential. The strategy assumes substantial support from close allies and coalition partners such as Japan, South Korea, our NATO allies and others depending on the scenario. Power projection in the form of strategic air and sealift as well as pre-positioned stocks both ashore and afloat will be fully resourced. Of equal importance, service inventories of ammunition (particularly precision-guided munitions), spare parts, and other critical supplies will be replenished and maintained. Aviator flying hours will be increased by 25% to increase proficiency and combat readiness. The defense budget for FY2026 is set at $850B, with a goal of $800B by FY2029.
Nuclear Forces Our strategic nuclear deterrent, commanded by US Strategic Command, consists of Minuteman III ICBMs housed in silos, our Ballistic Missile Submarine force equipped with the Trident D-5 missile, and nuclear capable strategic bombers. This force can deploy 1600 nuclear warheads. The ICBM force consists of 3 Air Force missile wings with 450 launchers. These are being modernized with deployment of the LGM 35-A Sentinel beginning in 2029. To comply with the provisions of the New START Treaty, the number of ICBM warheads will decline to 400 warheads. Our sea-based nuclear deterrent consists of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs which can deploy 1,152 warheads. Under New START these will decline to 1,090. The Columbia-class SSBN will replace the Ohio, which will remain in service through 2030, but the fleet will be reduced from 14 to 12. The third leg of the nuclear “triad” consists of 20 Air Force B-2 stealth bombers equipped with B61 and B83 nuclear weapons, and 76 B-52 strategic bombers, 30 of which are being converted to conventional roles under New START. Our strategy calls for the strategic bomber leg of the triad to be phased out by 2030, as the ICBM and SSBN force is fully survivable and poses a devastating retaliatory capability fully able to meet our nuclear deterrent needs. To provide more flexible deterrent options along the spectrum of conflict, we will also strengthen our tactical nuclear capabilities by increasing the number of nuclear capable fighter squadrons, equipped with B61-12 and B83 tactical nuclear weapons, and continue fielding of the W76-2 low-yield submarine-launched nuclear ballistic missile. The strategy also supports limited procurement of the nuclear-capable Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) cruise missile, as well as modernized nuclear command and control.
The US Army supports the National Security Strategy by fielding trained and ready forces to fight and win land campaigns in support of the Joint Force. Our strategy will increase the US Army from 10 to 12 full-strength active divisions while fielding four corps headquarters and one deployable field army headquarters plus associated enablers (Army staffs and headquarters organizations will be reduced to pre-9/11 levels to free personnel spaces) Active Army end strength authorizations will increase to 475,000 by FY2028, with the force balanced with six heavy and six light divisions. All divisions will be equipped with armed drones at every echelon. Light formations will retain a full complement of attack helicopters and antiarmor/heavy weapons companies and will be equipped with armor-protected wheeled vehicles. Army divisions will gain one general support 155mm artillery battalion, one air defense battalion and one electronic warfare battalion. Army corps will gain one 155mm artillery brigade and retain one multiple launch rocket brigade. Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) will be converted into maneuver brigades. By 2028, the Army will accept transfer of the A-10 from the Air Force and assume the close air support mission while transferring its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot assets and spaces to the Air Force. The Army National Guard will remain at an end strength of 330,000 with 27 brigade combat teams, and the Army Reserve at 180,000. The Army will forward deploy one corps headquarters with enablers, one Stryker brigade (relocated from Germany to Poland), one rotational division headquarters and heavy brigade in Poland, and one airborne brigade in Europe and will retain one division headquarters with one brigade combat team and enablers in the Republic of Korea. Army force structure will include one airborne division in CONUS as a Global Response Force for a total of 37 brigade combat team equivalents. All towed artillery will be replaced with wheeled, self-propelled 155mm artillery. The Army will continue research and development of future combat systems but will rely in the near term on modernized legacy systems such as the M1 Abrams main battle tank, M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, AH64 Apache attack helicopter, UH60 Blackhawk utility helicopter, CH47 medium lift helicopter, M109 Paladin self-propelled field artillery systems, the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System, and Patriot and THAAD air defense systems. The Army budget for FY 2026 will be set at $201B.
The US Navy supports the National Security Strategy by fielding trained and ready naval forces that provide nuclear deterrence, maritime dominance, and power projection in support of the Joint Force. Our Navy is by far the preponderant maritime force in the world and our strategy will assure we retain that dominance. The Navy will increase the size of the fleet to a planned total of 308 battle force ships with the Indo-Pacific region as its first planning priority. The projected composition of the battle fleet is shown below.
Aircraft carriers: 11
Ballistic missile submarines: 12
Attack submarines: 52
Cruisers and destroyers: 88
Frigates: 16
Littoral Combat Ships: 20
Amphibious ships: 38
Combat logistics (resupply) ships: 29
Dedicated mine warfare ships: 12
Joint High Speed Vessels: 10
Other (command and support ships): 20
Total battle force ships: 308
Given recent changes in the international security environment, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program will be curtailed at 20 units, while 12 planned LCS hulls will be upgraded and reclassified as frigates. Procurement of the F-35B will be halted in FY2026 to free funding for other strategic priorities, retaining an inventory of 185 aircraft. The Navy’s Carrier Air Wings will thus contain a mix of F-35B, F/A-18 E/F and F/A-18C strike aircraft. US Navy research and development will focus on use of unmanned air, surface and submarine platforms for surveillance, target acquisition, strike missions and intelligence gathering, as well as alternatives to large deck carriers, which will become increasingly vulnerable in the next generation. The Navy budget will prioritize readiness of the current fleet (i.e. overhaul, repair and deferred maintenance) and its munitions inventories. US Navy end strength will increase over the FYDP from 333,000 to 338,000. The Naval Reserve will be manned at 60,000.
The US Marine Corps supports the National Security Strategy by fielding trained and ready forces for amphibious assault and crisis response in support of the Joint Force. Marine forces will also be prepared to fight with Army formations in sustained land campaigns if required. Our Marine Corps is the finest and most powerful expeditionary force in the world and we will maintain and strengthen its unique capabilities. The strategy calls for an increase from eight to nine infantry regiments plus enablers to fill out the 3d Marine Division (the Marine Raider Regiment will be converted to an infantry regiment, while the elimination of Marine artillery and tank battalions and bridging companies will be reversed). Marine detachments will deploy afloat on all principal surface combatants as formerly. The Marine Corps will continue research and development of future combat systems but will rely in the near term on modernized legacy systems such as the M1A2 Abrams main battle tank, the Light Armored Vehicle, the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the V-22 Osprey transport aircraft, the CH53 heavy lift helicopter, the AH-1Z attack helicopter, the UH-1Y assault/lift helicopter and the F/A-18 strike fighter. F-35B and F-35-C procurement will be curtailed by FY2026 to generate savings for other strategic priorities. USMC F/A-18 squadrons will be relieved of carrier aviation augmentation requirements. USMC end strength will be set at 180,000 for FY 2023. The Marine Corps Reserve will continue to be manned at 35,000.
The budget for the Department of the Navy will be set at $250B for FY2026.
The US Air Force supports the national security strategy by fielding trained and ready forces that provide nuclear deterrence and air dominance for the Joint Force. Our Air Force is the strongest in the world and the strategy is committed to maintaining that clear superiority over all potential rivals. The Air Force will continue to operate its legacy F-15, F-16, B-52, B-1 and B-2 aircraft fleets with program updates and service life extension/replacement programs as needed. Currently programmed investments will continue for the KC46 tanker to replace aging legacy tankers (KC10 and KC135). The F-35A program will be curtailed in FY26 to free resources for other strategic priorities. The F-35 fleet, together with our inventory of 187 F22s and 20 B2s, will constitute a low observable/stealth capability to degrade and defeat adversary integrated air defense systems to facilitate operations by follow on, 4th generation air units. USAF A-10 platforms and associated personnel spaces will be transferred to the Department of the Army beginning in 2026. The B-21 Long Range Strategic Bomber program will not go into full production to free resources for other strategic priorities. By 2028 the Air Force will take ownership of the high altitude air and missile defense mission from the Army and accept transfer of Army THAAD and Patriot systems and spaces. Air Force research and development funding will prioritize future, high performance unmanned systems, with an emphasis on very long range, precision-guided munitions and space systems, including hypersonic systems. USAF force structure by FY2026 will be set at three Minuteman III ICBM missile wings, 54 fighter squadrons (Active, Guard and Reserve) and six bomber wings; 19 strategic airlift (C-17, C-5) wings, 36 tactical airlift (C-130) wings and five Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (MQ-1, MQ-9, RQ-4) wings. USAF end strength is set at 321,000 across the FYDP. Air National Guard end strength will be increased to 108,000. The Air Force Reserve will be manned at 70,000.
US Space Force The US Space Force, as an independent service within the Department of the Air Force, was established in December 2019 as a sixth military service following the creation of USSPACECOM as a separate Unified Combatant Command in August 2019. Our overriding interest is to prevent the militarization of space and to facilitate its peaceful use as a “global commons.” The Space Force will remain focused on space domain awareness, missile warning and defense, defense of U.S. satellites from hostile attacks and offensive counterspace operations to degrade an adversary’s ability to conduct space-based attacks. We will not initiate offensive military operations in space, but to ensure our national security we will field the capabilities we need to ensure space dominance. The Space Force will be manned at 12,000.
DOD space activities are funded in Department of the Air Force budget, which for FY2026 is set at $255B.
Special Operations Forces Our Nation’s SOF represent an invaluable capability that can be projected quickly across the globe to carry out precise and discriminate operations requiring advanced capabilities not found in conventional forces. However, SOF end strength increased dramatically following 9/11, causing a loss of quality and drop in performance. US SOF will often operate out of the public view and in scenarios both above and below the threshold of armed conflict. When deployed in peacetime they will operate under the control of the local State Department Chief of Mission, unless otherwise directed by the National Command Authority. During active hostilities they will operate under the control of the designated Joint Force Commander. US Special Operations Forces will be sized at five US Army Special Forces Groups, the Army Ranger Regiment, six Navy SEAL Teams, 15 USAF Special Operations squadrons, and the Joint Special Operations Command. Special Forces battalions will revert from four to three battalions. Ranger battalions will revert from four to three rifle companies while the Ranger Regiment will lose its intelligence battalion. US Special Operations Command is responsible for manning, training, equipping and supporting US SOF and for synchronizing planning for global operations against terrorist networks but will not exercise operational control in geographic combatant command areas of responsibility. US SOF end strength is included in service totals and will be decreased from 70,000 to 60,000. The FY2026 operating budget for USSOCOM is set at $15B.
Strategic Mobility As our military forces are largely based in the continental United States, power projection is a critical capability required by our strategy. We will continue to fully resource our strategic mobility platforms and capabilities, which consist of strategic airlift and sealift and prepositioned equipment sets, both ashore and afloat. Under USTRANSCOM, our strategic mobility is provided by 34 Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) loaded with combat equipment and supplies; 8 US Navy Fast Sealift Ships and 13 Roll-on Roll-off cargo ships, supported by commercially chartered military sealift ships; 277 Air Force strategic airlift aircraft (C-5 and C-17 heavy transports, supported by 455 strategic tankers, plus the commercially contracted Civil Reserve Air Fleet); and four Army Prepositioned Sets (APS) located in Europe, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the continental US (as well as a fifth afloat). USTRANSCOM also relies on commercial maritime carriers for sealift. Our strategy calls for a level of strategic mobility sufficient to project two MTW-sized force packages sequentially and sustain them during extended operations. With funding reallocated from other programs, we will enhance our airlift and sealift capacity to meet this requirement. These programs are funded through the Transportation Working Capital Fund, which draws on service budgets and other appropriations for services provided.
Missile Defense The goal of US national missile defense programs in recent years has been to provide a defense against nuclear attack from smaller states with a limited nuclear capability. (Comprehensive missile defense against an all-out attack by Russia or China is economically infeasible and would in any case be inherently destabilizing) At great expense, this effort has yielded a marginal capability to intercept small numbers of incoming ICBMs launched by North Korea or Iran. Our strategy calls for modernizing our strategic nuclear deterrent while defunding national missile defense, which currently consists of ground-based interceptors based at Vandenberg AFB in California and Fort Greely Alaska. Our strategic nuclear force supported by tactical nuclear weapons is more than ample to deter small nuclear powers, while funding for national missile defense can be better allocated to other strategic priorities.
However, we will continue to field and upgrade theater missile defense systems to protect our forward-deployed forces and regional allies. These consist principally of the sea-based Aegis system, which can acquire and destroy ballistic missiles in the boost phase; the “Aegis Ashore” system being fielded in Romania as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPASS); the land-based Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot anti-ballistic missile systems. THAAD can target ballistic missiles exo-atmospherically, while Patriot provides a layered defense against air-breathing, surface to surface ballistic missiles. These technologies provide an effective, layered defense against ballistic missiles for our forces and allies in forward theaters, backed up by our strategic nuclear systems. For FY2026 the Missile Defense Agency will be funded at $7B.
Unified Combatant Commands. DoD’s seven regional and four functional combatant commands provide joint command and control in designated mission areas. Forces, equipment and personnel are assigned to the combatant commands by the services as directed by the Secretary of Defense and are funded by the services. Combatant command exercises, joint training and contingencies are funded through the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund. This strategy contemplates no changes to the Unified Command Plan.
Defense Overhead DoD’s 20 Agencies and 8 field activities as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff represent organizations which provide important support to the warfighter but have become bloated and often inefficient over time, cutting into resources available to the fighting forces. This strategy proposes a 10% reduction in staffing by 2028 and the elimination of those agencies created after 9/11. These reductions will be applied to the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commands as well and will be funded through Defense-wide accounts totaling $144B for 2026, declining to $124B by 2029.
Dr. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council, following previous service as University Professor, Distinguished Research Fellow and The Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Affairs at the National Defense University.
Photo credit: by Edoardo Cuoghi on Unsplash