Note of Extra TAG Virtual Conference, January 18, 2024
Red Sea Strikes, Supply Chains and Geopolitics
Anarchy is perhaps the best word to describe the situation in the Middle East now. The war in Gaza has intensified several long-term conflicts, most notably between Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States and wider regional tensions between and within Shia and Sunni majority regimes. Whilst Iranian influence is clearly apparent in the recent attacks by Yemen’s Houthi regime on shipping it is unclear the extent to which Iran controls it, not least because Tehran is itself divided into factions.
The most Western powers might expect is “to keep a lid” on the conflicts in the hope that tensions ease. The one clear aim of Western statecraft must be the preservation of freedom and security of navigation the reason for the Anglo-American strikes on Houthi bases in Yemen. 30% of world sea trade and the 50% of oil and gas shipping that passes through the Bab el Mandeb between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
There were several actionable conclusions to this debate the most salient of which is that whilst there are linkages between two epicentres of struggle in the Middle East, the war in Gaza and an opportunistic Iran’s subversive activities across the region, none of the powers therein seek war, even if Tehran believes it benefits from a “spirit of confrontation”. Whilst the strikes in the Red Sea, disruption to global trade and wider geopolitics are linked they are “separate but not separable” given the underlying dynamic of regional instability apparent for decades. There is also little evidence that the various Iranian proxies in the region are fully under Tehran’s control. Western statecraft, such as it can be fashioned, must be at best defensive and indirect but built on an expert understanding of all the conflicts and actors involved if threats are to be contained.
The US will continue to protect supply chains through the Red Sea over the short-to-medium term, but Europeans will have to get used to increased prices caused by disruption to global supply chains. One option could be to convoy trade through the Red Sea, but most Europeans have a “peace DNA” and are thus too risk averse even to risk their own warships undertaking such a mission. Equally, if trade is re-routed via the Cape of Good Hope there would also be significant costs. The US Navy would be further stretched if a general threat to trade were to ensue, and Egypt could be critically destabilised by the loss of $10 billion in annual transit fees if the Suez Canal were to be effectively blockaded.
The Western response has been at best partial. France insists on escorting only ships under its own flag, whilst France, Italy and Spain refused to endorse the Anglo-American action. The EU High Representative, Josep Borel, suggests the EU could undertake a mission in the region but given the risk averseness of Brussels and the lack of military capabilities available it is unclear just what such a mission would be and in the absence of a clear entry and exit strategy most Europeans will continue to rely on the US to enforce freedom of navigation.
The possibility of a second Trump White House is also exercising Europeans because a new Trump administration would doubtless point to the action in the Red Sea as yet further proof that Americans are having to risk lives and spend money securing Europe’s vital supply chains. Whoever is in the White House it really is unclear how long Americans of any political persuasion are willing to accept such a dismally weak Europe, be it in Europe or beyond.
Julian Lindley-French
Photo Credit: Mohammed Ibrahim on Unsplash