“Finland and Sweden might have just joined NATO, but they are not newcomers”.
Welcome to NATO, Sweden! On the day Sweden joined the Alliance the TAG considered the costs and benefits of NATO’s latest enlargement. The consensus was the NATO is strengthened significantly by Finland and Sweden, even though the Alliance’s Area of Responsibility has, on paper at least, expanded. Through the Enhanced Opportunities Partnership and the Partnership Interoperability Initiative Finland and Sweden have been virtual members of NATO since 2015 with both countries bringing additional Russia expertise to the Alliance. NATO’s deterrence and defence ‘space’ is now more coherent across air, sea, land and beyond. Finland and Sweden also believe Russia poses a long-term threat to their security with both bringing a ‘Total Defence’ culture which significantly strengthens NATO’s Northern Flank. Finland also brings to the Alliance a very capable army, whilst both Finland and Sweden have very significant air power. The Nordic states can now boast 250 front-line capable fighters. The security of the Baltic States is also strengthened, although more needs to be done to reinforce Estonia and Latvia. Finnish and Swedish are offering some rotational support of forces for Enhanced Forward Presence.
Will the enlarged Northern Flank cause Moscow concern? Moscow was surprised by Helsinki and Stockholm moving so quickly. The enlargement clearly gives NATO a larger strategic footprint with the contested Arctic of growing importance whilst the Baltic Sea is effectively a “NATO lake”. Moscow also fears the vital St Petersburg-Murmansk corridor, St Petersburg and the Gulf of Finland, and Kaliningrad are more vulnerable. Russia has made its displeasure apparent with hybrid warfare and cyber-attacks on both countries and further attacks below the Article 5 threshold are likely. Russia has also made plain its opposition to NATO infrastructure on Baltic Sea islands, such as the Aland Islands and Gotland.
Whilst Finland has adopted a “pragmatic, no caveats” approach to NATO membership, Sweden is more nuanced, but the trust between the Nordic allies which will make it hard for Moscow to “divide and rule”. There will also be a stronger “Nordic voice” in the Alliance, with much of the Nordic focus on enhanced defence industrial and technological co-operation. Stockholm will likely place protection of its larger “national champions” to the fore, whilst others will be more open to buying capabilities off the shelf (COTS). There will be some practical military adjustments needed, such as to the NATO Command Structure and the question of nuclear participation must be addressed. Will the two countries have dual-capable aircraft? Finland has already purchased 64 F-35s. Will both countries escort nuclear-armed F-35s on “Snowcat” missions? The Nordic states are also strong believers in close EU-NATO relations, particularly in areas such as defence-industrial co-operation and enhanced societal resilience. Equally, the accession weakens the case for autonomous EU common defence.
“History matters”. Going forward, and because Sweden to some extent felt obliged to follow Finland into NATO, when the Social Democrats return to power a renewed debate over Stockholm’s tradition of non-alignment might re-start. Having joined NATO, it is unlikely Sweden would withdraw.
Julian Lindley-French