“Germany has got the message”.
Two years on from Chancellor Scholz’s historic Zeitenwende statement, what is the evidence Berlin has changed the direction of German defence policy? 75 years since NATO’s founding the Alliance faces a series of questions none of which perhaps is more important than the role Germany aspires to play in the future defence of Europe and the wider transatlantic relationship.
There was no consensus over the extent to which Zeitenwende marked a mindset change on the part of German leaders and people on the role and utility of hard power, or whether Realists or Idealists had the upper hand, or whether it was simply a reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. That said, it would have been unheard of even five years ago for a German Defence Minister to speak of the need for a “war ready Bundeswehr” as Boris Pistorius has called for. There is also some evidence that Germany is prepared to play a stronger role in the defence of Europe, but in NATO not the EU.
Improvements to the Bundeswehr are constrained by support for Ukraine and the lack of any preparedness for a future long war of attrition which would require far greater war stocks with an industrial and technological base configured appropriately. Rather, the focus is on meeting NATO’s immediate force requirements. German short termism is reflected within the wider European pillar of the Alliance given divisions over the seriousness of the threat Putin poses to NATO and Moscow’s ability to sustain politically or industrially either the current war or some future a high-end long war with NATO.
There was consensus that Europeans needed a “much stronger military establishment” within which Germany would play its full role. The inherent weakness of Zeitenwende is also shared by the two other major European military powers Britain and France. This is a tendency to exaggerate the impact, credibility, and speed of relevance of current peacetime levels of defence investment reflected in a potentially critical lack of military capabilities. Zeitenwende also suffers from the same failing as the rest of Europe with the lack of any coherent plan to move the Bundeswehr from where it is today to where it would need to be given the stated ambition.
It is also questionable whether the Berlin political class stay the political course of Zeitenwende, not least because defence cost inflation means demands on Germany’s public finances will be heavy even to fund a modest improvement in the Bundeswehr’s fighting power. A paradox of Zeitenwende is that Berlin will couch any improved German preparedness for war prevention in a European context, even though the National Security Strategy effectively marked Germany’s abandonment of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Given the political pressures such tensions will create, Zeitenwende is only likely to be sustainable if both sides of mainstream politics support it and speak coherently and consistently to the German people. Current levels of public support suggest a “software change” has taken place in Germany but it cannot be taken for granted.
Perhaps the most important test of Zeitenwende will be on the critical US-German essential relationship. As Americans demand more of their European allies the choices Germany makes will be critical to the burden sharing debate much of which is about the US-German relationship.
Ultimately, Zeitenwende will stand or fall on Germany’s willingness to provide the backbone of Allied collective land deterrence and defence and in relatively short order. There is some evidence Berlin is preparing for such a role, but like its European partners, Germany has a very, very long way to go. For Berlin to commit to such a path in return Washington would need to reaffirm its commitment to providing Germans with a credible extended nuclear deterrent.
Julian Lindley-French
Photo Credit: Maheshkumar Painam on Unsplash