[This Policy Paper is published by ISPI and is available for download here]
In Brief
The prospect of Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025 has raised concern in many European countries, which fear i.e. a possible American disengagement from NATO and continental security at large. It is entirely conceivable, however, that also in the event of a second term for Joe Biden the United States be forced to shift its strategic priorities elsewhere, notably towards the wider Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region, thus calling upon its European allies to take up more responsibilities for their own security and defence.
NATO still represents the only credible ‘deterrent of last resort’ against what is now clearly a more aggressive and threatening Russia, while the EU as such is still largely unprepared to take up a substantive role in the defence of Europe, despite the recent increase in military spending and the tangible support for Ukraine all across the continent. The first challenge for European governments, therefore, lies in boosting their contributions to NATO – e.g. by re launching and reframing the old concept of a “European pillar” inside the Alliance – with a view to preserving its credibility in the event of a partial American disengagement. The second challenge lies in making the best possible collective use of the recent initiatives taken by the EU in this domain, especially in terms of defence industrial policy and market practice.
NATO and the EU have long been seen as two organisations based in the same city but living on different planets. After the end of the Cold War, both engaged in peace support operations “out of area” – sometimes with complementary initiatives, sometimes with competing or duplicative ones – while direct bilateral relations are still complicated by the Turkey-Cyprus spat. The willingness to project their military into other regions may have diminished lately – especially after setbacks in Afghanistan and the Sahel region – but the security environment in and around Europe has significantly worsened and requires concerted action.
NATO and the EU – which now have as many as 23 members in common – should therefore explore options to make their interaction a positive-sum game, i.e. by playing to their respective strengths and building ad hoc channels and formats to better align their efforts in the defence of “EUrope”. This would not necessarily require major institutional reforms on either side: for NATO there are useul precedents to take into consideration, while for the EU there are treaty provisions that have barely been used till now. A more convergent approach, could indeed be implemented in parallel and in unison, thus generating “strategic synergies” that would make defending EUrope “Trump-proof” and, above all, containing Russia sustainable over time.
Increasing military interoperability between the two organisations, i.e. by reducing duplication and competition; aligning capability development plans and processes, i.a. by facilitating direct contacts between their respective military staffs; getting “more bang for our bucks” (and especially our euros) by investing and procuring jointly, with tailored incentives from the EU; and fine-tuning future EU and NATO enlargements by bringing to bear the comparative advantages of each organisation: these are all options worth testing, while keeping in mind that money matters (in terms of both the amount to be allocated at various levels and the modalities for using it efficiently) but so does political determination and ingenuity – and both have to be mobilised for what is likely to be a long game.
Full Policy Paper
Antonio Missiroli, ISPI Senior Advisor. Previously, he worked in the European Commission and was first Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies and then NATO Assistant Secretary-General. He teaches at Sciences Po (Paris) and SAIS Europe (Bologna).