[This article was first published by CEPA]
Europe is under attack and has no serious response
“Ouch!” That is the aim of deterrence. The adversary should feel that they have miscalculated. Their target was not intimidated, Instead it responded with something effective and painful.
Russia (and other hostile states) have been testing deterrence in European and North American countries since the 1990s. Invading neighbouring countries. Cyber-attacks. Economic warfare. Interference in political systems. Arson. Sabotage. Murder. The list is long. But the list of effective responses is very short. Nothing that Britain, the United States, France, Germany or other big Western countries have done has produced the “ouch” in the Kremlin (or in Beijing, Tehran or Pyongyang) that makes regimes in those countries think that they have seriously miscalculated. So they keep going.
Western decision-makers protest vehemently against the charge of ineffectiveness. They point to sanctions, to expulsions, to an array of diplomatic, military and other responses. Yes—all that happened. But has anything we done deterred further attacks? Clearly not, for they continue.
Even now, most Western countries will not leave their comfort zone. They will help Ukraine resist full-scale military invasion, but not with enough money or weapons to guarantee victory. They will react to Russian attacks on their own soil, but only with performative sanctions: press releases, diplomatic expulsions, and economic sanctions that do not really hurt anyone.
The price for this timidity is paid most conspicuously by Ukraine. For now, Russian glide bombs, missiles and rockets do not rain down on European cities. Germans return from their anti-war demonstrations to sleep peacefully in their own beds, rather than camping in bomb shelters.
But Europe is under attack too. The drones that buzzed Stockholm airport last week, the GPS jamming that interfered with Finnish civil aviation, the increased Russian military activity around undersea cables, numerous cyber-attacks (including some that are not made public) — all these are examples of Russian hybrid aggression that stretches far beyond Ukraine.
And there is no answer. What would Britain do, for example, if mysterious drones interfered with aviation at Heathrow airport? Airlines are easily scared. It is easy to imagine foreign operators deciding that it is safer to halt flights to London. The disruption and damage to the British economy would spiral.
What would Britain do? The arsenal looks thin. Britain’s nuclear weapons are useless. A cross press release and the expulsion of Russia’s remaining diplomats from London will not produce the “ouch” factor.
One option would be to react using Ukrainian capabilities. Provide the manufacturing, financial and intelligence help needed to ensure that Ukrainian drones can do the same to Moscow’s airports. Another would be to ask allies to help. Imagine that Norway announces new restrictions on Russia’s presence in Svalbard, and at the same time Finland says that technical difficulties will temporarily restrict the operation of Russia’s spy base (sorry: consulate) on the Åland islands. Meanwhile European financial authorities would swoop on Russian-linked banks in Cyprus.
Even better would be if Britain moved out of its comfort zone and started dealing with the enablers: the bankers, lawyers, accountants and other besuited accomplices who keep the wheels turning for the Kremlin’s sanctions-busting. Some of them are actually based in Britain, but rather more are in the United Arab Emirates and similar jurisdictions. If they thought they faced professional censure, civil liability or criminal prosecution, the business-class seats on the Kremlin’s gravy train might suddenly look less attractive. And the “ouch” effect would hit not just them, but their clients in Moscow.
All this is possible. But it is still unlikely. Western countries care deeply about their own security. But not quite deeply enough. Russia knows that. We don’t.
Photo Credit: Viacheslav Ratynskyi / the Collection of war.ukraine.ua