“Stop sh***ting your pants! Let us fight!”
The Ukrainian demarche into Russia’s Kursk Oblast poses two essential, possibly existential questions. First, if Western supporters of Ukraine gave Kyiv all the military aid they call for could Ukrainian forces expel Russian forces from the 18% of they hold? Second, if Ukraine causes Moscow significant and sustained political embarrassment with the Kursk demarche will Russians begin to question the sacrifice? There are two distinct camps in response to those questions: optimists and pessimists. The optimists believe the Ukrainian demarche into Russia’s Kursk Oblast was a clever attempt to put Moscow on the back foot both politically and militarily. The pessimists see the demarche as a desperate gamble by Zelensky to force the Russians to ease military pressure on the Pokrovsk axis.
The optimists argue that the demarche has several goals: the need to show Ukraine’s Western backers that a Russian victory is not inevitable, the Americans in particular; embarrass and thus weaken Putin politically in Russia; ease the threat to Kharkiv; demonstrate Russian military weakness by trying to break out of the attritional warfare that favours the Russian way of war; demonstrate that Russia’s ‘escalatory behaviour’ is bluster; reinforce proof of Ukrainian determination in the wake of a very difficult year for Kyiv; and enable Ukrainian forces to strike deep into Russia.
The optimists also believe it is vital to support Ukraine through an increased military commitment and at the very least remove any restrictions on the use of Western supplied munitions. Any talk of possible ceasefire negotiations is dangerously premature because it would force Ukrainians to negotiate from a position of relative weakness. The optimists also point to the absence of a “patriotic surge” in Russia in the wake of the demarche, a weakening economy, and stirrings of social unrest. The confused chain of command between the Russian General Staff and the FSB also points to political and military tensions in Moscow.
The pessimists argue that the demarche has failed in its primary objective of forcing the Russians to turn the axis of their military effort from east-west to south-north. They are also concerned that by exploiting relatively weaker Russian forces in the Kursk Oblast the Ukrainians are wearing down some of their best brigades to create a vulnerable salient. Such a salient will be hard for Ukrainian to exploit further and will need to be defended going forward over a long line of contact. Moscow can afford to wait because it has the strategic depth and can use the salient to pin down quality Ukrainian formations. Kyiv should thus withdraw and reassign its forces in the Kursk Oblast to blocking Russia’s Pokrovsk offensive. One discussant also suggested that Moscow believes that if it can break through at Pokrovsk with little formal Ukrainian defence behind. Another discussant countered that argument by calling the Kursk demarche a clever asymmetrical move by Ukraine and that invading Russia for the first time in 80 years reinforces a belief that Putin is failing.
The pessimists also point to stated Ukraine’s concerns about the weakening of US, British and German support. They also question whether European powers can continue to give Ukraine current levels of military aid given the pressures it creates on already constrained military inventories given the lack of military-industrial capacity and restricted defence modernisation and procurement budgets. For example, the new British government has hinted it may seek a 20% cut to already limited funding for defence modernisation. Ukraine’s military-strategic goals were also unclear with one discussant likening the demarche to the December 1944 Battle of the Bulge – unrealistic objectives sought at great sacrifice.
To conclude, there have been many ‘red lines’ crossed in the Russo-Ukraine War and Kyiv’s Kursk demarche is another such line. However, it would be dangerous to believe there are now no red-lines in this war. There are roughly six weeks of manoeuvre warfare campaigning left until the autumn rains set in, but the strategic, political and military evidence would suggest a possible new and decisive phase of the war in beginning. If Ukraine can hold its gains inside Russia it could be politically useful going forward, but should Russia at some point crush the Kursk salient that would be disastrous for Ukraine and its campaign of self-defence. Equally, it would be a mistake to under-estimate the Ukrainians who have demonstrated a sustained capacity to innovate and exploit opportunities.
Therefore, even if Western supporters gave Ukraine all the military aid they call for short of direct involvement in the war there is little sign Kyiv will realise its objectives of expelling Russian forces and restoring its 2014 borders, let alone its 1991 borders. As for Putin he may seem entrenched in power but then all such autocracies appear so until they collapse. This places a premium in Ukrainian thinking on the psychological impact on Russians of the Kursk demarche.
Julian Lindley-French