[This article was first published by CEPA]
Failure to respond to Russian active measures is creating a dangerous world
Why is it so hard for the West to respond effectively to Russian unconventional warfare? It is not a shortage of means. The United States and its allies are far bigger in economic and military terms. Nor is it because of intelligence failure. We know what is going on. The problem is that our decision-makers cannot synch their words and deeds. They either ignore Russian behavior, or describe it lamely as “unacceptable”—but then show with their actions that they accept it.
One worry, particularly in the US administration and in countries such as Germany, is escalation. Reacting precipitately or disproportionally may (insiders say) provoke the Kremlin into doing something even nastier, perhaps using proxies like the Houthis in the Arabian peninsula.
Another worry is about frightening our own population. Once you admit that Russia is scrambling data-bases in the health-care sector, disabling transportation, intruding into airspace and maritime zones, abducting, beating and murdering people it does not like, and (much) more besides, then it suggests that you are not in control.
The current approach is not just ineffective. It is harmful. The Kremlin may be road-testing its tactics in the run-up to an all-out conflict, or using them for specific goals, or both. But the evidence is overwhelming: Russia does not fear our response.
Instead, the “hybrid attacks” (or to use an older, better term, “active measures”) are escalating. Other countries see that the costs are low and the benefits handy, so they will join in too. Concealing the real picture from public view corrodes trust. People will find out eventually. They do not like being lied to. The policy of restraint also strains alliances. Decision-makers in the front line do not appreciate being told from bigger, safer, faraway countries to stay quiet and still when their sovereignty is threatened. Some of them are looking thoughtfully at Israel’s ability to act independently.
The mess reflects broader problems. One is the lack of a Russia policy. Big Western countries flinch at the idea of regime change in Moscow. They are terrified of Russia disintegrating. They fear that whoever comes after Vladimir Putin may be worse. The aim is therefore to constrain Russia, supporting Ukraine enough that it does not lose, and hope that things get better. Some officials say that this is “strategic patience”. That worked during the Cold War. But both words in the phrase are missing. The signs so far are that we do not even have the willpower to sustain Ukraine over a three-year war, let alone provide the decisiveness and resources needed for a decades-long generational struggle. This is strategic patience with no strategy and no patience.
A proper strategy would accept that we are under attack from a range of adversaries and that we need to sacrifice time, money and convenience in order to stay safe: getting a bigger boat rather than worrying which crocodile to deal with first. In practice that means strengthening our own systems to make attacks costlier and less effective. Finland has shown how to do this, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society resilience woven into daily life. Second, we would work on deterrence, identifying Russia’s vulnerabilities. Some of these we could signal. Others would be nasty surprises, the products of lateral thinking. One unexploited weapon is visa sanctions against enablers. Britain may be too feeble to stop its bankers, lawyers, accountants and others from helping our foes. But the United States and the European Union can put these pinstriped accomplices on their visa blacklists. If all Western countries did this, keeping a snout in the enemy’s trough would suddenly look less attractive.
Photo Credit: Serhii Nuzhnenko (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) / https://war.ukraine.ua/