“The transatlantic relationship as we know it is over.”
There was agreement that the election of Trump 47 will function as an accelerant for Europeans to increase their respective and collective contributions to their own defence. However, the Administration will demand more than Europeans can deliver over the short to medium term. Divisions will rapidly emerge between the non-US members of NATO. Transactional Trump cares about money, energy, and China. European allies must agree to share a much greater burden of the Alliance (see the TAG Transatlantic Compact) and buy more LNG from the US. They must also seek to convince the Administration of the interconnectedness of global conflict. Trump will give both Canadians and those European laggards yet to reach 2% GDP on defence “a greater incentive to take NATO seriously”.
The good news is that NATO is not top of “Trump’s hit list”, which is China. Europeans also already have experience of a Trump administration, and some leaders have learnt how to deal with him, most notably the new NATO Secretary-General Marc Rutte. Russia is also significantly weaker than it was during the last Trump term. The election of Merz in Germany’s February 2025 federal elections could finally see Berlin “re-prioritise” and become a more serious defence actor. The world has changed markedly since Trump 45.
However, the tone of the debate was pessimistic. Trump’s control of the three branches of government may not be what it appears, and the Administration is likely to be chaotic. Given that the allies must work to “keep NATO’s lights on” by emphasising improvements made to Europe’s defence effort since Trump 45 and emphasise repeatedly what they can offer the US.
Allies should be under no illusions as to the scale of the challenge Trump 47 will pose and the global repercussions of what Trump imposes on the EU and NATO Allies. From Day 1 the Administration is likely to impose trade tariffs on the EU. Team Trump is also full of China hawks, and he is also likely to impose up to 60% tariffs on Chinese goods and services. China will respond by flooding the European market. Beijing-Washington relations will decline markedly, reinforcing in the Chinese mind the need for an anti-Western autocratic axis.
Ukraine that will be most at risk. Kyiv is already uncertain about the level of military and other aid it can expect from the new Administration and is pushing hard for the Biden team to increase support in the run-up to the January 20th inauguration. Trump’s commitment to end the war on Day 1 could well be part of a wider effort to divide China and Russia at Ukraine’s expense. Ukraine’s future relationship with NATO and the provision of security guarantees will be a source of contention with the Administration.
The challenge for Europeans is that Trump is “always strong with the weak” and Europeans are too important to simply punish. Therefore, Europeans must try to be strong” by playing to Trump’s transactional view of alliances and partnerships. They should agree to 3% GDP defence expenditure by 2030 if not before both at the spring mini-summit and the June 2025 NATO Hague Summit. Unfortunately, there is little or no leadership in Europe.
The re-election of President Donald J. Trump reveals a “struggle over the soul of America which will cause a windstorm in the transatlantic relationship”. “The real question is what do we Europeans have to do anyway?” European allies must finally face up to their real defence needs and act accordingly. Trump will no longer permit Europeans to only recognise as much threat as they want to afford. He is not the only American who thinks that.
Julian Lindley-French