[This article was first published by CEPA]
Ukraine is ill-defended, but Europe’s missile gap is worse
Europeans wake to read news of Russia’s daily drone and ballistic missile attacks on Ukraine. If they knew how vulnerable their own countries are to such onslaughts, they would sleep less well. As the Oslo-based academic Fabian Hoffmann notes in a recent briefing, Europe’s position is becoming increasingly precarious. Russia is producing large and increasing numbers of ballistic missiles at moderate cost. Nato countries still make far too few of the weapons that can shoot them down, and do so too expensively.
Hoffman’s number-crunching casts a bleak light on Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte’s demand for a five-fold increase in air and missile defenses.. Russia makes two kinds of missiles relevant here: the short-range (500km) ground-launched 9M723, and the medium-range, air-launched Kh-47M2 Kinzhal. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia currently produces a combined total of 840 to 1,020 of these annually, substantially more than previous estimates.
Europe’s defense against these weapons depends on two systems: the American MIM-104 Patriot and the French-Italian SAMP/T. Both require interceptors—the rockets that shoot down the incoming missiles. At $2m-$4m each, these are up to ten times more expensive than the projectiles they must deal with. Worse, Europe does not produce enough of them and will not do so in the foreseeable future.
Here’s why. Combined Patriot interceptor production in the United States, Japan and Germany is likely to reach 1,130 by 2027, up from around 850 now. By 2029 it could be 1,470. Not bad by past standards—and on paper about the same as Russia’s annual ballistic missile production. But these interceptors are needed everywhere; European allies will be lucky if they get half the number produced. And not every interceptor brings down a missile: experience in Ukraine suggests that two or even three are needed.
The other option is the Aster 30 interceptors used in the SAMP/T system. Hoffman estimates that annual production for ballistic missile defense will reach 230-270 next year. But in Ukraine, this system has underperformed compared with the Patriots, meaning even more interceptors will be needed to shoot down an incoming missile. Worse, Russia is also producing huge numbers of long-range drones. As in Ukraine, these could saturate Europe’s limited defenses, giving the more destructive ballistic weapons a greater chance of hitting their targets. New technology—notably but not solely from companies such as Estonia’s Frankenburg—offers the prospect of low-cost, mass-produced systems to deal with these slower, lower-flying weapons. In the long run, laser weapons could do the same for fast, high-flying ballistic missiles. But not now, and not soon.
Europe’s ramped-up production since February 2022 might be enough to deal with prewar levels of Russian ballistic missile production. But it is not nearly enough to deal with the output of Putin’s war machine now. Chillingly, most—two-thirds or more—of Russia’s missiles fired at European Nato countries would hit their targets.
European decision-makers would therefore have to prioritize, concentrating their limited missile shields on vital military and intelligence bases and critical infrastructure (chiefly ports and power stations), rather than on population centers. The politics of that will be tricky, to say the least.
Unless Nato finds a way of magically crashing Russian missile production, it will have to rethink deterrence. As Hoffman argues, European NATO states cannot credibly deter Russia by signaling they will successfully defend themselves against an attack. Instead they must deter by punishment, ie “by signaling that any attack will come at an unacceptable cost.” That will require building a formidable and credible counter-strike capability (where are the factories for that?), and creating a decision-making system that can use it (where are the people?).