[This article was first published by CEPA]
The Russian attack on Poland highlights alliance weakness
Violating Polish airspace could turn out to be Vladimir Putin’s worst mistake. Imagine that it leads to the instant seizure of Russia’s frozen central bank assets, and to the transfer of $300 billion to finance Ukraine’s resistance. Another result could be accelerated progress towards the “drone wall” promoted by the EU’s defence commissioner, Andrius Kubilius. The attack could also built political consensus behind a new rearmament bank to finance Europe’s urgent increases in military spending. And it might lead the United States to reverse any planned cuts to its military presence in Europe, and to programs that support the Baltic states and other frontline states. An optimist could imagine a really serious squeeze on the Russian economy leading to political unrest, even regime change.
In reality, none of that is going to happen. Instead, we will see expressions of grave concern, perhaps even outrage, coupled with backslapping at the speedy response of Polish and allied warplanes in shooting down the drones. We may see another package—the umpteenth—of European Union sanctions on Russia.
Putin will not conclude from any of this that he has made a terrible mistake. Instead he will sit chuckling in his bunker, and will continue his successful policy of highlighting the gaps in the alliance’s escalation ladder and the weaknesses in its decision-making. This involves systematically testing our reactions and our willpower, sometimes with overt attacks, more often with hard-to-trace stunts and sabotage. Remember, this approach has deep roots. “Active measures” were a feature of Soviet political warfare from 1917. The Baltic states were warning friends and allies about Kremlin mischief-making and dirty tricks back in the 1990s.
Another common thread is that again and again these attacks go almost unpunished. The cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007 brought only handwringing. A string of incidents this year in Sweden leaves officialdom there mute and seemingly clueless. Across Europe, the repeated, persistent use of drones to breach airspace, disrupt civil aviation and collect intelligence highlights another vulnerability. And because these attacks go unpunished, the Kremlin widens their scope and increases their intensity. Their practical aim is not just to sow dismay and division. It is to undermine support for Ukraine, and to encourage European countries to join the Trump administration in arm-twisting the Kyiv authorities into an unfair, unsustainable, humiliating ceasefire deal
Europeans mostly fail to realise this. They still hope plaintively for a decisive American intervention. But those days are gone. Barring a game-changingly robust response to Poland’s invocation of Nato’s Article 4 collective-defense clause, the US security guarantee to Europe has been exposed as empty. In so far as the US administration does care about European security, it is not to bolster its defences, but to reduce the competitive and regulatory threat it poses. It seeks less renewable energy and more liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports. It wants less interference with US tech companies over data privacy, copyright and political advertising, and in protecting youngsters from pornography and other abuses.
That is no cause for despair. Europe is big and rich enough to defend itself, if it chooses, both from Russian imperialism and from the machinations of US corporations and their political servants. What is lacking is willpower. Threat perceptions, and the capabilities needed for defense and deterrence, still vary hugely across the continent. Some countries are outright cheerleaders for Putin. Others are paralysed by political polarisation (France) or allergic to any sacrifice (Spain, Belgium). Or, like Britain, they cannot envisage a policy that does not follow a US lead.
But this is their choice. Nobody—yet—makes them behave this way.
Photo Credit: Polsat News via REUTERS