The Porcupine meets the Anaconda
“Taiwan could be important enough for the US to go to war over”.
President-for-Life Xi Jinping is determined to realise One China in his lifetime and re-unify the Republic of China with the People’s Republic of China. How and why One China is achieved remains. That strategic political goal pre-supposed China’s forces are good enough to play an assigned role in support. Are they?
The discussion considered two missions: an invasion of Taiwan and war with the Americans and its allies in the wider Pacific. China might be able to successfully invade Taiwan but only at a great risk. China would lose a war with the Americans beyond the First Island Chain. The latter such threat is both separate from Taiwan and far less likely.
The very uncertainty of China’s military intentions towards Taiwan and the response of the US to either scenario make the current situation increasingly dangerous. For example, whilst the Biden administration would probably have gone to war to defend Taiwan the position of the Trump administration is less clear. There is also division within the Euro-Atlantic community. Most Europeans have accepted the One-China policy as a future reality.
China has built a significant force to undertake an invasion of Taiwan, but it is still believed Beijing’s position is more akin to Operation Sealion in 1940 than D-Day and Operation Overlord in 1944. In 1940 Nazi Germany sought to coerce Britain to settle with the threat of an invasion that could only have been undertaken at the greatest of risk. This is not least because of the lack of experience of the People’s Liberation Army in the conduct of massive and contested maritime amphibious expeditionary operations. “The last significant kinetic campaign was in the 1970s” and that did not end well.
The debate centred on risks to Xi’s Han nationalist regime that might lead him to conclude such a risk implicit in such a military adventure was worth taking. Economic collapse that led to the weakening of the Communist Party of China’s control was the obvious risk. To mitigate such risk China is expanding its nuclear capability to achieve ‘second strike’ status between 2030 and 2035.
Before any such operation would be ordered China would focus first on establishing an effective blockade allied to efforts to subvert Taiwan’s political leadership. Beijing would also intensify the information and cyber war it is conducting against a politically deeply divided Taiwan and prepare to seize and or destroy Taiwanese critical infrastructures. Further factors that constrain Beijing include the levels of corruption evident from the top of the command pyramid in the Central Military Commission and below.
Given the centrality of One China and the ends, ways, means and risk of invading Taiwan Beijing will “not play fair”. Given the centrality of the PLA to China’s global image some form of ‘invasion’ of Taiwan is coming. However, any ‘invasion’ is likely to be a form of Anaconda as Beijing applies several instruments of power to constrict Taiwan to the point of submission. Taiwan’s best defence would be some for of Porcupine to inflict sufficient poison to force the Chinese to ease the pressure.
Any kinetic US involvement in the defence of Taiwan would involve US forces firing on mainland China. The Pentagon has also become focussed on China as a military threat. There is clearly a pressing need for Washington to re-balance its statecraft through greater diplomacy. Ultimately, the determining factor in the ‘how’ and ‘when’ of One-China will be the credibility of US deterrence.
Julian Lindley-French