“The mood in Kyiv is very autumnal”.
War or Not War
No. Ukraine is not cracking but it is under intense pressure both politically, economically and militarily. Then, so is Russia. The change in the dynamic of the war is exclusively due to President Trump’s “Not War” demarche. “Not War” because there would be a very significant difference between a cease-fire and what might pass for what could lead to a “catastrophic peace” for Ukraine if Europeans continue to self-deter. At least the “muddle diplomacy” of the Trump administration has revealed the “bottom-lines” of European security.
Zelensky’s domestic challenge will be to convince Ukrainians that a cease-fire that freezes Russian military gains is a price worth paying for “Not War”. Putin’s challenge will be to convince Russians that any outcome less than the total subjugation of Ukraine is a victory of sorts and worth the immense sacrifice in blood and gold. NATO’s challenge will be to maintain a European push to increase defence expenditure when “Not War” is presented as peace.
The 28/20/19 point “peace” plan is seen by some as “bad US diplomacy” but it does contain some surprising points of potential agreement, not least Moscow’s apparent yet ambiguous willingness to let Ukraine become an EU member-state, however long and difficult such a process might be. This is possibly because “the more ambiguity the better for Moscow” because it will add to “Ukraine fatigue” across much of the West, particularly Europe. “Not War” would also likely prevent a weak EU from acting to use frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction when the EU is financially weak. Any question of EU membership would also likely sow further divisions and cause resentment amongst other Accession States.
SITREP
The “mood in Kyiv is very autumnal” because people have a long held and deep-seated mistrust of the government. Still, the will to fight remains and there is little threat to Zelensky’s position. The problems are threefold: corruption, a lack of clear direction and a new narrative in support of the war. The consequence growing tension between the need to conduct the war centrally and the creeping localisation that the war is spawning.
“The situation on land is vital to negotiations”. It is particularly important in and around Pokrovsk because “it is a vital logistics hub” and a symbolic battle much like Bakhmut. However, whilst its loss would be significant it would not be critical. Ukraine is adapting. What is critical is the maintenance of the “fortress belt” which would be at risk if Russian forces broke through the next line of defence beyond Pokrovsk. The symbolic importance of the fortress belt is akin to the “Mutual Defensive Line” of Czechoslovakia in 1938.
Fudging
The Peace Plan reveals tensions within the Trump administration, most notably between Rubio and Vance, with the former seemingly and possibly temporarily in the ascendant. Efforts to end the fighting also take place in parallel with an increasingly assertive Merz-led Germany. One consequence could be Germany finally willing to take its place as Europe’s political and military leader.
NATO has been absent as a factor in discussions even though any outcome of the current negotiations will have profound consequences for the Alliance. This is not least because the devils would be in the details of any security guarantees offered by the West to Ukraine with NATO to the fore. Putin is seeking to treat the US as separate from NATO to sow even further divisions as part of his grey zone warfare against Europeans. Rutte’s challenge to prevent Putin from succeeding by keeping Trump engaged in Ukraine with NATO Allies.
“The best outcome might be a ceasefire without any agreement”. This would enable a fudge by which the West could refuse to accept the de jure seizure by Russia of Ukrainian land, whilst acknowledging Russia’s de facto control.
All very 1930s.
Julian Lindley-French