“AUKUS involves the building of the most sophisticated machines ever made, even more complicated than Artemis”.
Headline: Canberra faces a similar but even more acute dilemma than the UK – at current levels of defence investment and given poor defence investment practice Australia can either afford SSN AUKUS or a credible deployable conventional force but not both. The 2026 Australian National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program does little or nothing to ease this dilemma.
Despite the political turmoil in the transatlantic relationship the trilateral Australia, UK, US security pact (AUKUS) to build a new fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and develop advanced defence tech is proceeding. The specific aim of the AUKUS Pact is to equip the Royal Australian Navy to maintain high-end interoperability with the US Navy and thus deter the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy. The Americans are becoming militarily over-stretched for which the AUKUS Pact has a similar utility for the Americans as the 1904 Anglo-Japanese Treaty by easing pressure on US forces at Australia’s expense. The greatest challenge is the capacity of British and Australian defence industries to deliver the submarines on time and reasonably within budget by the mid-2030s.
AUKUS has two pillars. Pillar 1 involves the construction of a new fleet of submarines (SSN-AUKUS) that will follow on from the UK Astute class with advanced US technology and built in both Britain and Australia. Pillar 2 is designed to generate some of advanced technologies of the US SSN (X)/Next Generation programme that will be installed on SSN AUKUS. AUKUS came at Australia’s request following discussions between Canberra and Washington when it became clear that the Attack/Barracuda class submarines designed by the French would be incapable of meeting the threat posed by the Chinese Type 095 SSN.
“The dominant issue is industrial capacity and skilled workforces”. Over the past thirty years all three powers cut their defence technological and industrial capacity and skills at the very moment China was rapidly expanding its own. The UK is currently completing the last of the Astute class SSN (HMS Agamemnon) and building the first two of four Dreadnought-class SSBN. In theory, the UK has both the capacity and workforce to build SSN AUKUS but a culture “of delivering late and greatly over-budget” is needed. Australia is a small country with little defence industrial capacity and experience. US yards are fully committed to servicing US SSN and SSBN and building SSN-X.
Political support for the Australia-US alliance remains very strong whilst support for AUKUS is firm. Return on Australian investment will remain a vital issue for this “extraordinarily expensive” programme. There has been no debate comparing SSN-AUKUS with other cheaper deterrents with both sides of politics in support it. The Albanese government has skilfully used the cost of AUKUS to avoid spending 3.5% GDP on defence that President Trump demands.
A “New AUKUS” is being explored. Construction would be taken away from the UK and focused on the US and Australia which President Trump supports. The impact on US-UK relations would be incalculable. A new AUKUS could see Pillar 2 move from experimentation to fielding and “be spun off with a new title”. AUKUS could be opened to other Partners such as Japan, but probably only Pillar 2. A new AUKUS might also include a Pillar 3 to better connect NATO with US Allies in the Indo-Pacific beyond the current ‘AP4’ arrangement.
One radical option for easing the defence technological and industrial pressures implicit in AUKUS could be to involve the one other Western power with the nuclear experience and expertise – France. The price would no doubt be high.
Louise Dedichen and Julian Lindley-French