By-the-book responses don’t work when dealing with Russian state terrorism
Germany is under attack, but it does not know how to respond. The news that the suspected perpetrators of the near-fatal attack on Leipzig airport last month are a Russian linked to that country’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, and a Belarusian, highlights both gaps in defence and the lack of deterrence. The Russian (who entered from Turkey and then left for Serbia) was identified on arrival as having GRU connections. But the German authorities lacked the resources to put him under surveillance. (Many will find it outrageous that someone with this background was allowed to enter the Schengen zone at all.)
The Belarusian (also unnamed, in accordance with German privacy law) entered via Latvia. He had no known intelligence connections, though he had criminal records in Lithuania and Finland. Again, why let someone like that into your country? This person was most likely a “throwaway” agent – hired for cash to carry out the legwork: putting 1.8 kg of powerful plastic explosive on drones aimed at a Ukranian transport aircraft, laden with 25,000 litres of aviation fuel. An inferno was avoided only by chance.
In the West Germany I remember from my youth, attacks of this kind were rife. The far-left Baader-Meinhof gang carried out numerous fatal bombings, shootings and kidnappings in the 1970s and 1980s, against military, industrial and other targets. The authorities reacted with great (some say excessive) firmness, with extensive surveillance, manhunts and raids on suspected safe houses, backed by anti-terrorism legislation that increased police powers and high-level multi-agency cooperation.
Yet the Baader-Meinhof group (also known as the Red Army Faktion) were not an existential threat to the German state. They had some support from the Stasi secret police in East Germany, but they were at most a footnote to the struggles of the Cold War. The wave of Russian state terrorism now breaking over Europe is quite different. It is part of a big plan to break Nato, destroying the US-led security order which has kept the western half of Europe safe, free, peaceful and prosperous since the late 1940s (and since the 1990s has included most of the rest of the continent too).
Yet Germany (and other countries such as Spain, France, and Belgium) is not taking this seriously. Germany did nothing in 2024 when US intelligence uncovered a Russian plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, CEO of Germany’s largest arms company, Rheinmetall. That sent a clear message to the Kremlin: keep attacking us.
This time the German authorities have closed the Russian consulate in Bonn and the Russia House a cultural (read: propaganda) centre in Berlin, tightened travel restrictions and urged the EU to step up sanctions. It is not nearly enough. At the Riga Conference last week (Latvia’s annual security shindig) I did not find a single participant, among the hundred-plus diplomats, spooks, politicians, officials and security experts, who thought Germany’s response would deter future Russian attacks. So they will continue.
Deterrence, and the lack of it, in this “sub-threshold” domain of warfare was the main subject of the conference discussions. What can Germany and other European countries do to make Russia think that this mixture of violence, lies, bribery and intimidation is too costly?
Forget the “by the book” responses. The answer is to hit back, jointly with allies. Use a cyber-attack to crash a Russian provincial bank. Send some drones to close an airport. Tie up the sanctions-busting “enablers” with lawsuits and visa bans. Seize the Russian central bank assets and give them to Ukraine.
None of this is easy or risk free. But the alternative is more attacks, and worse ones.
Edward Lucas is a British writer, journalist and security specialist.
Photo credit: Yannic Kreß on Unsplash