[This article was first published by CEPA]
Infrastructure and transportation networks are under attack. Where’s the response?
Another month, another cable. Now a data link between Latvia and Sweden has suffered serious damage. One possible culprit, a Maltese-flagged bulk carrier, the Vezhen, has been escorted into Swedish waters. Finnish and Estonian naval vessels are shadowing another, the Pskov, a Russia-linked Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) carrier. Oddly, this ship turned off its transponder just as it was crossing the cable.
This has the makings of a serious standoff. Will Russia send a warship to escort its merchant vessel to safety? What will NATO ships do to force the Pskov to stop and cooperate with an investigation?
The incident follows several episodes where Russia showed it could sabotage NATO countries’ subsea infrastructure with impunity. The Newnew Polar Bear got away with damaging a gas pipeline in 2023. Germany failed to deal with the Yi Peng 3 after its catastrophic anchor-dragging in October 2024 which damaged power and data cables.
The tide turned when Finland used special forces to seize the Eagle S,after that ship’s Christmas Day cable-cutting escapade. NATO allies in the Baltic region then scrambled to create a new project called Baltic Sentry, pooling resources to monitor the Baltic Sea and—they claimed—deter any further mischief. The latest attack suggests that Russia’s response was not to back away, but to try again: a reminder that reestablishing credibility takes time and involves risk. It is better not to lose it in the first place.
But that is what the West has done during decades when it failed to react firmly to Russian aggression in all domains: cyberspace, land, sea, and air. A flight from London to Vilnius earlier this month, for example, had to land in Warsaw after its GPS navigation was disrupted. Experts blame electronic warfare operations in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. According to a report from the Barents Observer, in the high north Russia is not just jamming satellite-navigation signals, it is spoofing them too. This could send unwary aircraft off course. Commercial airliners now take extra precautions when flying near the Norwegian-Russian border.
Sabotage is only the superficial side of this aggression. It is best seen as psychological warfare. Interfering with aviation, for example, could mean that a Western aircraft (perhaps even carrying passengers of interest to the Kremlin) has to land in Russia or Belarus. Along with attacks on physical infrastructure, these stunts, real or feared, undermine the confidence of all citizens that the authorities have got a grip on the security of daily life. Even if they do not result in actual disruption, the attacks prompt counter-measures that cost time, nerves and money. Distracting the adversary’s decision-makers is already a victory.
The attacks also highlight Western disunity, dithering and differing risk appetites. Some countries rightly see this aggression as an existential threat to their sovereignty and freedom. They want to react quickly and forcefully. Others flinch at difficult decisions. They prefer to prevaricate, to demand more investigations, to carry out more consultations, to commission studies into future options—and to talk themselves, and allies, into doing nothing. If we fix these self-imposed mental problems, then the practical elements of the necessary response—military, legal, economic and political—will fall into place.
So far, the signs are positive. Latvia and Sweden have acted with exemplary promptness, in close consultation with their Finnish, Estonian and other allies. The next test is the European Union foreign affairs council on January 27. Some diplomats will reach for their well-thumbed lexicon, with its carefully calibrated expressions of “grave” and “deep” concern, grandstanding rhetoric about “unacceptable behaviour”, and seek a consensus, however feeble. Others will demand action.
Photo Credit: by Frames For Your Heart on Unsplash